I Still See Dead People.
The point of what casualty calculations, whether from the Cold War or not, is utterly lost; or insinuated to be irrelevant because Iran is killing people and that wrong apparently outweighs all other considerations. I could go on at length about how Containment, crafted by Keenan for the Truman administration, was decided upon in the absence of nuclear conflict since the USSR did not detonate their first nuclear device until 4 years after the assumption of Containment as national policy, but that would be skipping the point as well. It was the cost of the end desired, namely the defeat of the Soviet Union, and its inherent costs versus other means of acquiring the same end which was the whole and only point. Said costs and calculations were done regardless of nuclear arms in the equation.

The Cold War example is essentially:
1) All actions, choices, and goals with respect to the USSR had associated costs.
2) One needs to understand the costs of each choice, action, or goal.
3) There exists a significant non-zero chance that indirect confrontation attains your goal for you at lower overall cost.

That is a universal in decision making, actually. The example was only to bring it to the fore.

Nor is it merely the weak-kneed snobbery of White Tower intellectuals. B.H. Liddell-Hart’s Strategy is an entire work on this concept of attaining strategic goals via an indirect approach. Toughness, manliness, or announcements of one’s presence ‘with authority’ are only useful if they actually buy you what they want. Liddell-Hart pointed out that in the realm of poli-mil affairs that just as often as not the indirect works better, is cheaper, and doesn’t exhaust a nation the way direct confrontation could.

If it costs me, hypothetically, approximately 9 millions dead in six months of direct conflict and 9 millions dead over 40 years to achieve the same goal using proxy wars how can one say the former is better? Yes, I know all about the integration of misery under a curve analytical tool. But, if one is focusing on the dead as the basis of correctness or stupidity of an action is not paying a higher price for the same item usually considered the worse play?

Let’s apply this same hypothetical (read as the numbers were chosen strictly for illustration only, they are not from actual analysis) to an Iran conflagration. 9 millions represented by 1 million from the actual war, approx 3 million starving in China from lack of fuel to move food within six months, an equal number in India for the same reason, and another 2 millions from the rest of the world, particularly in what we used to call the ‘Third World’, that cannot afford higher costs for a diminished total supply of petroleum passing thru the Persian Gulf. What have I gained in doing that? And how long in comparison to another hypothetical situation with a further hypothetical death rate from Iran’s proxy war-making before I reach that 9 millions? If it is a matter of decades can I truly say I’ve gained anything?

Now, keep in mind, I am not the one who said that deaths were the deciding or most important factor. I am just pointing out that if one holds deaths so important the full accounting of the dead should also weigh on your decision making. If it takes decades to attain the same number of mortalities then can you say, since the policy was predicated on death-toll, that you have actually gained much of anything beneficial?

Repercussions do matter greatly when you accept, as you must, that a confrontation or conflict does not exist detached, does not operate like a duel with only the two fighters affected by the outcome, from everything else.

The repercussions go beyond the US, the EU or the ME and branch out into countries around the world since energy will be diminished, food, medicine, clothing and shelter will rise dramatically. More than they are today.

It’s a true statement, the above. But it is not only true for allowing Iran to be the ‘bully’ by gaining a nuclear weapon. A war to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons carries the exact same repercussions, sooner and more severely, and likely in higher amounts. Those costs need to be considered as per my hypothetical, and, if one is making the decision based on the number of dead, policy adjusted accordingly. In most people’s books, the payoff better be real good if you are going to buy something that expensive.

Why sooner? Iran has the capability to close Hormuz as we speak. That was the significance of the Brecher story a few weeks ago. Mining Hormuz closes it. It is no secret that Lloyd’s of London cancels insurance for vessels passing thru such warzones quicker than snap. Iran has the capability to do exactly what has been stated as the worry over the use of an ‘economic weapon’ right now without a nuclear weapon. They can with the ballistic missiles they currently have shut down the Saudi oil fields, tomorrow. Attacking them does not prevent the economic/oil weapon that has been discussed. It brings it on in a much harder to fix/clean up scenario. Hence, the world’s poor die of hunger and preventable disease in vast numbers while the 1st World economy shudders if not seizes like a car engine without lubricant in summer heat.

Nor does Iran’s proxy war capability depend upon nuclear weapons. Hezbollah is a major nuisance and was formed without nuclear capability as backup. What is the justification for implication that unconventional capabilities are dependent or will become more pronounced with nuclear weapons in Iran’s hands? It does not seem to follow since Soviet SOF and US SOF wax and wane depending upon personnel available and not nuclear weapons backing up said SOF. It does not agree with history as to why these non-conventional forces were created or methods initially studied.

Lack of a nuclear weapon seems not to prevent Iran from partaking of shadow war and slaughter of innocents right now or for the last 20 years. Our having nuclear weapons, and Israel’s long known open secret of nuclear arms, does not seem to have any effect on their actions what so ever right now. Maybe it is not the nuke that makes that dynamic go? After all, such 4th Generation Warfare forces are by their very design and intent to be means to circumvent advantages granted a major industrial power for a weak industrial power. Nukes seem not to be the enabler for proxy war and 4th Generation Warfare methods employed by Iran, or anyone else, at all. More likely it is that the US and Israel are nuclear powers that has pushed Iran to ‘grab the belt’ as Giap tried to (and did) in an attempt to neutralize said technological advantage.

Someone I Know Is Standing In The Trenches
In relation to costs it has been said that because one’s child/friend/loved one is in the Services or in boot they understand the cost. No, that isn’t the point as it is not about personal costs and grief. That one will experience the loss of one’s kin and that said event is painful is not the point. Personal loss is not the point. Not to be a callous jerk, but it is not the point. “People die” is often lesson one for officers in war, and lesson two is often “your rank doesn’t mean you can change that.”

I accept that people will, must, die if any action will be taken; whether said action is a neo-Containment or direct confrontation or Barnett’s ‘Big Boy Pants’ theory. The question is scale and, more importantly, what have we bought with that particular amount of carnage? Are there other pathways we can go down that cost us less in terms of lives---and in other metrics---than a direct military confrontation?

One does not decide policy or strategy based on *who* will be lost. Securing a policy that buys a better peace, using Liddell-Hart’s definition of said peace, and what the cost of that purchase is what matters. Particular losses are rather inconsequential. It is the size and the object I am buying with them that is of prime importance, and, unfortunately, all else is fluff. If the goal is actually worth what I am paying in lives then I will spend it but one should not spend more lives than necessary.

It is not weakness or some bizarre need to be Neville Chamberlin that drives this. No. It is a dicta of Richard “Demo Dick” Marcinko, high priest of high testosterone warrior ethos, to not screw over one’s men. Going ‘hey-diddle-diddle-up-the-middle’ without considering whether or not another course of action is superior or viable is exactly that. Marcinko relates in one of his books the different fates of SEAL teams in Panama wherein one commander forced ahead with his plan regardless of facts on the ground and the other not only evaluated different options he had multiple plans to call upon for each option. The former, SEAL Team Four, got cut to pieces at Hato Airfield while the latter, Seal Team Two, pulled off its mission without a casualty. One guy *knew* evil was afoot, was dragon slaying, was unwavering, went with a one throw of the dice approach, and his men paid for it; the other asked questions, thought about his situation instead of emoting, and his men lived because of it. Sending men to die, asking—or condemning depending on your perspective------ civilians to die, in a furball which was un-necessary in that one could have bought the same end by different and cheaper means is, defacto, screwing one’s men; and worse for said civilians. Whether that is assaulting a meaningless hill or going into an unnecessary confrontation to achieve national goals it still counts as screwing the men… royally.

Kill ‘Da Wabbit, Kill ‘Da Wabbit, Kill Da Wabbit (eh, eh, eh, eh).
The following is rather emblematic of the ‘no questions necessary, just hit ‘em’ school of thought: How many millions have to die for the second Cold War to be considered a complete disaster compared to direct war?

There it is. Shock Battle it must be, our hoplites against the Persian horde for anything less is seemingly failure. Regardless of how many die as a result it must be done because millions will die if we do not. If millions die it is a failure. Just as many millions, from economic collapse brought on by closing Hormuz for months to years, do not apparently count as much because Iran has killed them. We. Must. Have. Shock. Battle. We. Must. Kill. ‘Da. Wabbit.(Eh. Eh. Eh. Eh.)

There is no value to be found in spreading the dying out over time to be found here, is there? No. There could not be any real advantage in not having an acutely high body count. The loss of economic output and other tangibles we will lose via a direct confrontation pathway are irrelevant. It is only the deaths and losses caused by Iran’s nefarious actions we will count.

What Are You Asking Him To Die For?
But for what purpose will we do this? To end evil is unlikely. To forestall an economic threat is our cause? No, not when the threat actually already exists and can be utilized while we speak can it be rightly cited. Will we save millions of lives in the process? Maybe, and it might actually cause more death and mayhem than if we took a different path---and that is not guesswork. What is our reason for taking a directly confrontational pathway?

What would be our aim coming out of said conflict that would make it worth doing? Would we be wanting to integrate them rapidly into the global economy? Are we deconflicting the ME and spreading democracy? What? What would be our purpose for doing this? An ‘anti’ strategy is not good enough.

In the Cold War we did not just deny a country to the Soviets. We did more, far more. We integrated it as much as possible. We supported monsters like Noriega, Pinochet, even Marcos (they should have flogged Imelda with all of her shoes) with a purpose beyond simple denial of Panama, Chile, and the Philippines to the Red Sphere of Influence. Americans died supporting all three. Their lives were worth it because there was more than just a ‘hands off, it is mine’ strategy that called for their lives to be sacrificed in pursuit of it. What would that be vis-à-vis Iran?

Shock battle for the sake of shock battle is screwing your men royal. What do you seek to purchase, how do you intend to shape the world coming out of this to make it all worth it?

Madden 2K1 Is Not Much Better Than Madden 2K, But 2K7 Is a World Apart
Is it also possible that a ‘go slow’ approach is preferred and has inherent advantages over Kill Wabbit? Is it possible that the issue of iteration of choices puts us in a stronger position? Nash’s economic theory seems to support this. So does recent evolutionary biology. A series of sub-optimal, not for the all the marbles choices may actually lead to greater outcomes over the long term.

It is not like Great Captains of the past did not recognize this. Gen Eisenhower saw that the Broad Front idea allowed for change with iterations of choice in ways that simply letting Gens. Patton and Montgomery go buck wild in offensive glory would not. A ‘go slow’ or Barnett’s ‘Big Boy Pants’ approach does not discard future offensive action should it become necessary.

Each logic gate, since I choose to model it that way, has three options: a) Kill ‘Da Wabbit b) Neo-Containment c) Barnett-ian Big Boy Pants. Options b and c give us the option to choose a series, and the concept that it is a series is of prime importance, of moments of choice where we can consecutively choose options that move the pile forward toward a better peace. We would not be deciding such a situation with long lasting ramifications on a single throw of the dice. Iterations of choice give us the opportunity to minimize the death tolls and other associated costs. There are examples of this phenomenon in economics, evolution, and war being used beneficially.

Of course there’s the risk that things go south on any iteration or consecutive iterations of choice. That is always possible. There is no zero risk approach. We have seen this sequence play out on the Korean Peninsula in a mixed bag fashion. Given that DPRK threatens 3 major US trading partners from whence the majority of our electronic supplies come from--- PRC, Japan, ROK--- one cannot say that potential DPRK action via CBW does not already give us an analog of Iran, no microchips no economy, and yet the carnage of 50 years of dealing with DPRK iteratively is still cheaper than the one big gulp approach.

Failure is also possible with a single throw approach such as Kill Wabbit, and recovering from that is far harder than the iterative approach. Destroyed or damaged oil fields will not be quick fixes as the Kuwaiti experience shows. Market Garden was hard to recover from because of the logistical losses such a one-and-done approach incurred.

Kill ‘Da Wabbit is not a panacea. It is a particular policy choice that has its place in the tool box.

Evil, Evil, Evil.
A litany of evil acts have been listed at one time or another regarding Iran. Whether it be actions during the Iran-Iraq war or proxy means to attain Iranian policy or support for terrorists like Hezbollah it is meant to show that Iran is evil and that Iran cannot be a rational, and ergo stable and predictable, actor. Because Iran is evil we must attack.

I do not deny that many of the acts are, truthfully, evil. It is also irrelevant. Robert Mugabe is evil, his regime is evil, and has a body counting numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Burma is a flat out freaking mess. Sudan is still tagged as genocidal warfare by the ruling faction against the non-Moslem factions by the UN. So? Irrelevant. What would invading or other muscular acts in these countries buy the US? Going off like an knight errant to drive all dragons from the kingdom makes for great epic poems and romances, it is not a coherent means of deciding for a nation.

Are we to be governed by the R2P (the right, or responsibility, to protect inherent in the UN charter) then? Will we then find ourselves invading Sudan, Burma, and DPRK then? Wherever we are told there is an evil regime, one that abuses its people, foments trouble for neighbors, or fights proxy wars we will have to attack then? If it is based on the two factors of evil and body counts one would be hard pressed to find a justification for not going into places like Sudan, Burma, and the DPRK (particularly North Korea, the king daddy of proliferation, murder and kidnapping of foreign nationals, and active belligerent threat to its neighbors.).

Evil is a poor ‘gotta’ factor in decision making. There’s so damn much of it around after all. Being consistent in policy would mean we would be tied to policies that lead to many Kosovos, many Somalias, and take downs of every whackadoo dictator like Kim Jong-Il regardless of what it buys the US. Such an ‘Onward Christian Soldier’ sermon works on Sunday but it is not sound policy.

Not Bowing Down To Darth Sidius
Which brings me back to the central thrust of the initial piece: can we get to a defanged/irrelevant Iran/Iran we can live with via another route? Are there iterative pathways that get us to the same place for far lower costs? Do not all other options than direct confrontation amount to bowing down to Emperor Ahmenidijad ne Palpatine (a.k.a. Darth Sidius)?

Is it possible to give nuclear weapons to UAE and other ME nations to counter Iran and end the problem via a MAD theory soft kill? Actually yes it is, and it is standing these nations in Iran’s way instead of capitulation.

Can we extend our nuclear umbrella, meaning saying to Iran ‘any use by you means your nation turns into a glass parking lot’, and then providing neighbors with military aide to combat irregular forces get us there? Yes, it is possible to counter in just this way and then ‘buff up’ a nation’s forces to meet the unconventional threat. We have seen this sequence play out on the Korean Peninsula. Given that DPRK threatens 3 major US trading partners from whence the majority of our electronic supplies come from--- PRC, Japan, ROK--- one cannot say that potential DPRK action via CBW does not already give us an analog of Iran. No microchips no economy. And that is being handled in an iterative fashion that does not amount to capitulation.

There is a host of possible, viable pathways that can be considered or enacted that come well short of the beloved one throw of the dice shock battle for all the marbles to buy us what we want--- an Iran we can live with and a secure stream of petroleum for the world economy. They must all be considered and the ‘Iran is evil’ mantra does not dismiss them. It is the rare cure that is worse than the disease---chemo-therapy for example--- but I do not dismiss the possibility. Few amount to kneeling at Darth Sidius’ feet. Quite the contrary, many are standing up to the Sith but not in a winner takes all fashion.

Coda
Obsessions with slaying evil dragons or numbers of dead or with looking tough do not coherent policy make. Obsessions do not purchase the nation its goals for responsibly considered costs.
--ry

� Secure this line!

When I read this, I just get the sense from you, Ry, that we all ought to just sit by and do nothing. Why, there's nothing to get worried about at all. Everything will be okay as long as we don't do anything stupid or unnecessary, and just wait and let matters take care of themselves in the long run, eventually. Because, God forbid, if we do something, we'll just make them angry at us and this will just make things worse.

Why, the Cold War would have NEVER HAPPENED if we had not over-reacted when Japan attacked us on 12/07/1941, and went to war with Germany. The Cold War was all our fault, because we were the ones who helped defeat Hitler, and created the conditions that removed an important check on an expansionist USSR.

Oh, and never mind the fact that millions of Jews were dying in Nazi concentration camps. We would not have known about these anyway, since we woould never have liberated them or known about them with Hitler and his fellow Nazis still in control of the continent. Besides, that whole "Holocaust" accusation is nothing but a big LIE anyway, promoted by those pesky Jooos and the victorious Allies who needed to justify their "war of aggression" and "war of choice".

And if Truman hadn't done something stupid like issue that "Truman Doctrine" - you know, an over-reactive and aggressive policy that threatened the USSR which caused them to react in kind - we would have never needed to keep troops in Germany or Europe for 60+ years nor would we have fought proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, or elsewhere.

How could we have been so misguided and naive? How could we have let ourselves be MISLED so much by Truman, JFK, and LBJ - who lied about that Tonkin incident? Because Lord knows, if we hadn't gone to war in Vietnam, we would never have angered the North Vietnamese, and they would not have had reason to seek vengeance and retribution on those traitorous South Vietnamese who aided us when we withdrew from Vietnam, which caused that whole refugee and boat people problem. Oh, and that whole Cambodian mess, either. Those Khmer Rouge guys were not evil, after all. They just wanted to enlighten those misguided people who wanted a different society.

Etc etc etc.

PS - Did you change email addresses recently? I tried to thank you for you kind comments on one of your previous posts. I was out of town on business at the time, was too busy to post much.

I think you're being a bit unfair, Frank, and over-reading what Ry is saying.

As I read it - Ry's thesis is, Containment and the indirect conflict inherent in that approach gained what we were after (the collapse of the Soviet system) with fewer overall deaths than would have resulted from direct conflict (as he see's is advocated by Kat), and that approach should get as serious a consideration as the more robust approach advocated by Kat.

And Ry doesn't like the invocation of "evil" and "people are dying" as the rationale for going all kinetic.

Let's face it - as OIF shows, once started, wars develop a character all their own, and usually don't follow the path the initators were seeking. Ry also suggests that Iran is already capable of doing 90% of the mischief we fear without using nukes.

Ry is also positing that Kat may in fact kill more people than would die over the protracted approach he suggests - all in order to save them.

Kat's counter is that the Iranian government doesn't constitute a rational state actor and the issues of self-preservation extant in the Cold War don't apply, so the better to kill the threat abornin' than find out it's actually a psychopath.

Both arguments have merit - though I admit, I'm in favor, at least right now, of Ry's approach. I don't think we've got the ground combat power to deal with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

John,

I didn't mean to be unfair or flip. However, I did want to convey 2 things:

1) Everything is interconnected, and whatever policies, strategies, or tactics we adopt and pursue will inevitably lead to "equal but opposite" reactions from the other side, and consequences that are both foreseen and unforeseen, as well as positive and negative.

At every point in the decision tree, you're basing your actions on the reality as it currently exists, trying to solve the most immediate crisis first, even though you may be trying to plan ahead as much as possible. But Murphy's Law and the Law of Unintended Consequences always reign.

2) If we had adopted Ry's "containment" strategy with regard to Hitler and Nazi Germany, we might have prevented the larger war in Europe, preventing the continent wide destruction and millions of combat-related deaths that ensued.

But would the world have been better off?

Personally, I think the "containment" strategy pursued by the US, Britain, France, and USSR led directly to the horrors of WW2, when they failed to take adequate action at Germany's rearmament, Hitler's move into the Rhineland, Hitler's Anschluss of Austria, and their failure yet again at Munich over the Sudetenland.

Their "containment" strategy at these points may have prevented a "smaller" war in 1935, 1936, or 1938. But might this smaller war have prevented the much larger war that followed?

Heh. Mostly I used your comment as an excuse to show Ry how much you could condense his argument...

And to throw some props to Ry for his side.

I know, I know, Ry - brevity is for wimps!

I agree with John that I'm being largely misread here.

Itterative approach is not 'do nothing'. It is more like turning a car without flipping it or even better turning a semi without jackknifing. It's nudging things along in a positive manner, and just because I'm using the word positive doesn't mean holding hands and singing koomayah. Iran-Contra was a 'positive manner' in an iterative fashion.

The Nazi Germany example is being abused, me thinks. Teh Triple Alliance does not qualify as 'Containment'. That was simply defensive alliance making("Don't attack us becasue the other two will be in at your sides.") and none of the troika had the capacity to intervene. None could arm the Poles or the Romanians with the methods and means to stand against the Wehrmacht, as we did during the CW.

The current ISR network allows us to take 'Never Again' seriously while having the R2P protocol as legal @55cover for intervention, and one could say that the ability to intervene and see what Iran is doing is why we're not seeing ghettos and gas chambers for homosexuals. None of the big three had that capability at any point before 1939. The Triple Alliance does not count as Containment.

Containment is being abused. The Truman Doctrine is part and parcel to it. Korea was part of Containment; as was supporting folks like the slew of corrupt Philippine presidents, not denouncing S. Africa, and the support for the Contras. That was all part of Containment. Some of it was muy macho and some of it not. It was entirely iterative.

Fd, except for the 'worst crisis' as an absolute I'd agree with your #1 in the scond comment you made. Only when it moves strategy forward or halt dire threats does it make sense. Patton didn't worry about flank attacks because his threat to the enemy was great enough that the enemy quit flank attacks.(His famous, 'I don't worry about my flanks' comments). Same logic here. If and only if it gets me where I want to go or is about to kill my plans dead do I worry about a given crisis.

People are seeing what they want to see: any arguement that does not end with '...and then we kick their @55' is capitulation. That is far from the truth.

I knew morality was going to get tossed up. I predicted it inthe first rebuttal. Sure, it is a factor to consider. But, as I pointed out above, abuse of the Nazi example is not a proof for doing Iran. You haven't shown that they *are* as depraved as the NAzis and that not doing them leads to as horrible a world as not standing up to the Nazis would have. You've assumed it and not shown your supporting work as for why. Dangerous assumption, imo.

That doesn't rule out that they can be or are. Just sayin' that assuming it is a bad way of making up your mind or trying to win a debate on it.

John, I don't suggest. The capability is there. It is fact. the two Kilo class subs can lay 15+ nautical mines each per sortie, and mines they have aplenty(look at Galrahn's post over at InfoDissem on it). Mining Hormuz ends commercial traffic within it. That's just application of Formosa reality to an analogous situation. Someone else worked that one out. It isn't just a claim, some other analyst(guy who gets paid to do it) I know worked that out and I'm cribbing from him.

The BM attack is suggestion but the mines are not. But it would seem to be a decent educated guess given ranges.

And it's 'Brevity is for the weak.' Wimps are people who have the capability but not the will. THe weak simply don't have the capability. (Hyaa! Hyaa! Flog them electrons! Hyaa!)

see what Iran is doing is why we're not seeing ghettos and gas chambers for homosexuals.

Nope, they just hang them. After a "fair" trial of course.

But, on a different note, when we talk about "morality" as if it has no place in decision making, I believe it leaves us considerably blinded by cold numbers. When a country does things that are explicitly immoral (and I don't mean some namby pamby multi-cult outlook of "this is their culture" BS I mean political prisoners, absolute repression, and executions or imprisonment based on ideological concepts that have little to do with good ordering of society...homosexuality, changing religion, opposing government policies, etc), I believe it indicates the over all nature of the government and what we can expect from it on an intra- and inter-national scale.

For instance, besides Iran, there is Sudan. Certainly, Bashir was smart enough to ask Osama to leave and, at least, give an outward appearance of rejecting international Islamist terrorism, but, his internal activities of promoting Islamist ideologies and promoting genocidal assaults is representative of his actual international behavior.

Sudanese are some of the top "foreigners" found on battlefields we operate on. There are likely international Islamist terrorists receiving training, participating (training) against the internal citizens and Bashir is basically posturing his national government and organizing his citizenry in such a manner that, should the Islamists actually gain a foot hold or "legitimate" government in other states, he can easily align and reflect that ideology and alliance.

On the other hand, he is also positioning himself under the umbrella of the chinese, to hold power indefinitely. One could say that he is a pragmatist that needs to be watched.

I can see some of that in the Iranian movements, but John is correct that I am concerned that they have not quite settled over whether they are a rational state or a revolution. In otherwords, they aren't all that rational yet.

Part of that is due to their internal struggle to continue to maintain control of the government and keep it functioning under the "Islamic Revolution".

However, recognizing that doesn't mean that we should give them extra breaks since it means they also have the tendency and capacity to do just as you argue they are not doing. Extremist ideologies are considered extreme for those reasons. Largely, they have a tendency to be extremely reactionary in order to survive. An extremely reactionary government with nuclear weapons does not sound particularly safe to me.

While I can appreciate the idea of containment and believe that it has a possibility to work, I also believe that Iran's instability along with their move towards nuclear technology and probably weapons, makes them more dangerous at this moment than any other time. I also believe that the window for implementing successful containment is very narrow for the reasons I stated above.

Another issue that weighs heavily on my mind is "never again." I have a very strong feeling about those who routinely call for the destruction of others and hold Nazi like forums for conducting a defamation drive against people of any sort. Most particularly the 7 million Jews (of the 20 million left in this world) who reside in Israel. I believe that there is only one reason that this occurs and that is because Iran is trying to whip up support for a much bigger war with Israel since they know that Israel sees their nuclear activities as a threat.

I believe Iran wants this because they believe that they can consolidate their power over the region by advancing their leadership in the "fight" against Israel. That is the reason that they had their proxies in Hezbollah attack Israel in 2006. Not because it gained anyone anything physically, but because it increased their stature in the region.

Since I believe they have not reached rational stage of post revolution, since they have regional and global ambitions, since they have nuclear ambitions and since they are in fact exporting that revolution in order to meet their stated goals AND since I believe that, upon reaching those stated goals, they will create an even more horrific crisis, not just regionally, but internationally with oil and gas from the region under their auspices....

I believe that, yes, that would end up killing many more people directly and indirectly (through famines, raging energy prices and housing crisis, etc) than a direct war would.

In short, I would kill 200,000 Iranians today if it meant that 7 million would not have to fear death ten years from now either through nuclear attack or conventional warfare that these states might feel they can now perpetuate under the umbrella of nuclear weapons.

I would accept 1 million Iranian casualties if I thought that 10 million or more people around the world would be saved from a future with Iranian power firmly in control of the ME, its resources and exporting its proxies to kill and terrorize nations.

But, you know, I never wrote that war should be tomorrow. I simply believe that the window is much shorter than those who propose talking believe it to be. In fact, after thirty years of hearing the same comments from people about how the time is never right it does seem that those who advocate talking have never and will never accept any other action. So, yes, I feel the need to advocate a more hawkish stance so that we do not forget that we do have that option, we are responsible and able to assist in securing our allies survival (and securing ours) and that people and nations should know there is a line that we will not accept being crossed without a significant response.

And, no, I do not mean more sanctions.

Finally, John did surmise my point neatly. This isn't 1947. Iran is not the USSR. What we could or should accept as behavior from them should not be equal to anything we accepted from the USSR under those conditions. To do so and allow people to die under the acceptance of a new "cold war" and an unequal comparison of The Cold War until now seems, indeed, immoral and decidedly cheapening.

Further, to allow ourselves to be placed in a position of potentially diminishing survival due to Iran's control of the region and resources does feel unnecessarily suicidal. In the end, my entire premis is based on that being the primary concern, followed closely by our allies and then the rest of the world.

We no longer have grand enemies like the USSR, but that does not mean that we are not in danger. Even giants can be pulled down by a million little rabble rousers.

Dude, that was longer than anything I ever wrote except a historical review of the bombers of wwii.

But, to refer to another note or two, I'll be addressing your post later this week because I believe that you willfully misrepresented some of my points or choose to ignore them at your own peril and ours.

I guess the best way of saying this is: don't assume the casualties you fear so are inevitable because they are not. YEs, the full span of national power and means should be on the table and a containment-like policy would use some of that hammer(like the Libya raid) to further goals. But it is about costs, not fears.

Fear does not override the need to evaluate costs and means available(look at how the US pop reacts to deaths for esoteric reasons, and how that effects the ability to comitt the force necessary for a full takedown).

A 4th Gen approach can buy the same thing, the 10 million not dead and not oppressed, without the 1 million dead or the economic costs associated to making those 1million dead.

It should not be about how Iran relates in some historical spectrum of threats. IT should always be about are we securing the better peace. If it is 'insulting' to 'elevate' Iran to do so I don't give a damn and consider the idea that we shouldn't because it is emberassing to be silly to even consider. If it gets me where I want to be fine. If not fine. BUt because it is emberassing or ruins some categorization of threats historically as a reason not to consider is just flat out boneheaded.

It is not game over once they've fitted a nuc to a missile either. THEL and the ABL research programs in conjunction with the SM-3ER program for AEGIS means that having a nuc means a whole lot less in 2009 than it did in 1999.

That leaves their non-conventionals. The de Atkine and FARC experiences should speak to that. We train and equip nations to deal with it. We buy the same damn goal for a hell of a lot less.

It just means we've got to get over being scared to achieve it.(That short enough for you, John? I got distracted once or twice so it got a bit wordier than intended)

8^)

Gad Ry my eyeballs hurt. Well for what it's worth I'm more on your side with this one if we're talking sides which is a bit limited. I want to see careful considered thoughts and plans in the now context. We have time to do this cleverly. If it shows Kat's way is better though auf Wiedersehen. At this point in time I see US and other political will not being there and there being no good case for intervention. Is there a good third option?

What I would vastly prefer is Iran to grow up real-soon-now. That is the fairytale. sigh.

Hey, when did folk reach the point where they can only handle 500 words? Eh? Slackers. (yipe!)

There is a third option Argent. That's largely my point. Kat's way sounds like very muscular engagement with a preponderance toward breaking their stuff and rebuilding the country. There's the peace, love and harmony pipe dream. Then there's neo-containment with 4th Gen elements option which has low buy in, low stay in, and low closing costs. Building an ABM system is a lot cheaper than repairing Iran. Helping Lebanon fight its own battles is a lot cheaper(in cash and in bodies) than fighting it for them by taking on Iran. Building a mini-NATO to deal with bad actors in the ME is a lot cheaper than just deciding we've got to take someone down.

There's three options. All have strengths and weaknesses. But being ruled by fear on this is tremendously stupid. Go to War Historian's site and read his three part series Images of Enemy and Self. Then tell me this is not a situation where fears aren't calling the shots instead of reason.

I find it some what egregious that the argument for learning to live with a nuclear Iran assumes that we must accept that they will have a nuclear weapon or that we should begin our approach to Iran as if they already had one. Why are we precluding the prevention of those circumstances? Even unto military intervention of one stripe or another?

Second, in making that acceptance a center of our approach, we elevate Iran far above its actual current station that is politically, economically and militarily inferior to the United States. I don't mean to imply that it makes Iran less dangerous nor that their capabilities should be ignored nor even that it implies we should take whatever actions we like including immediate military intervention. However, no one has yet to give an acceptable answer as to why we should handicap ourselves and make Iran equal at the negotiation table.

This isn't a sport where sportsmanship demands each participant have an equal start or equal chance at winning the game. This is national survival and the state should seek to have the strongest position possible to insure it can have the most options available in dealing with another state. It is one of the reasons that I eschew the idea voiced by Senator Obama that he would reach out and seek an audience with Ahmedinejad without pre-conditions, thereby, doing exactly that: elevating Iran and Ahmedinejad's political position.

That is exactly what it would be and it would not only give the Islamic Republic cache in its own country, but on the world stage. Historically, every act of recognizing Iran or attempting to negotiate with it has led to Iran insisting they had the upper hand and, very often, rejecting negotiations all together. Believing, if you will, that they have already achieved their goal by a simple act and going forward from there. It's a brilliant political move on their part, but hardly imbues negotiations or "talks" with them with some greater value for us or any other erstwhile supplicant.

One idea is that elevating them may force them to grow up into a rational state and jettison their revolutionary ideas. Much, as was contended, as was accomplished with the USSR. I have to disagree with that considering the current political realities of Iran.

Most people look at Iran and see a state run by religious authority that came to power in the revolution. That is true in so far as the Grand Council still remains the guiding power. Many people also consider these men to be "the revolutionaries" since it was their ideas and leadership in 1979 that overturned the Shah's government.

However, the real revolutionaries were the students and Ahmedinejad was a key member. It is suggested that the Khomeinists had neither expected nor advocated for the taking of hostages at the US embassy and that it was a stand alone plot by the students that Khomeini was forced by circumstances (and possibly good political positioning) to support lest he lose the zealous revolutionary followers. There was and is a split within these revolutionary clerics as to whether they should pursue external revolution or simply concentrate on insuring control of Iran and its continuation as the embodiment of the Islamic idea.

Today, it is these same student revolutionaries who are quietly, and not so quietly, consolidating their power over Iran. They have maneuvered to place supporters on the Grand Council who will pick the next Ayatollah and have "purged" clerical allies from public office. When I say "they", I am speaking of Ahmedinejad and his other "former" Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, many of whom were the original revolutionaries. These men are indoctrinated with the revolution and their responsibility to grow it including outside of the Iranian borders.

These men also consider that the Council and many clergy there have lost their way from the revolution. They believe Iran is being pulled inexorably towards western culture and politics. They mean to re-instate the revolution and stop the slide as they see it. One of the reasons that they do reject open relations or simply talking to the US and others. With the IRGC at the controls, they believe that the clergy will be forced to support them or end up losing power and becoming figureheads under the new revolution.

In a paradoxic twist, the Mad Mullahs may end up being the cautious moderates in the face of a resurgent revolution. That is the issue that plagues the question of who exactly will have control of a potential nuclear Iran. Or whether, as has been suggested, it could be "grown" into a "rational state" a la the USSR. At least in any time that will preclude the deployment of nuclear weapons or any other egregious act.

� Secure this line!

Man this is like tennis.

Ok you have a grande point on the they don't have the nukes yet and what is can mean. However, your arguments from the beginning have been on the basis of when they get them. And they will, they know their survival depends on it nationally and personally.

Of course there's here and now negotiation tactics but the fact is Iran and the US are not negotiating so it's irrelevant. Iran needs them the US demands they not have them. The scope for talks is really small. On this basis the US either takes non-talk action or does not. So far it has not.

I'm not so sure I'm with you on Ahmedinejad being more extreme. Can you back this up?

Kat,

I am squarely in the camp that takes the position that Iran cannot be allowed to possess nukes, no matter the cost. The cost to accept a nuclear-armed Iran is too great for civilization, let alone the United States to bear.

I reject your consideration of the governing powers of Iran as rational actors. They have yet to demonstrate any rational diplomacy. rather, they continue to ejaculate inflammatory rhetoric and pronouncements aimed primarily at Israel and secondarily at the west. They continue to reject the concept of Human Rights and are well on their way to stripping both Universities and all libraries of any western influence through mass book burnings.

Iran is the world's leading state-level sponsor of terror, funding Hamas, Hezzbollah, and helping to train thousands of foreigners in nefarious means to use against the west.

On that last basis alone, we must conclude that Iran seeks nuclear weapons in order to carry it escalated attacks against the west, especially Israel and the United States.

We must listed to what Iran is saying and take them at their words. We cannot do less, because to do less is to follow the same course that permitted Hitler to take power and start the conflagration of WWII.

Everyone believed Hitler wasn't serious. No one wanted to take him at his word(s). Governments everywhere considered his actions and speeches and propaganda as just politics, just sabre rattling and nothing more.

Iran is acting in the same manner. Iran is stating plainly it's intentions and is rapidly arming itself to carry out those intentions.

We decline to take action at our own peril.

And yes, I am well aware of the risks and costs associated with such a move on our part. My own son leaves for basic in 2 week's time.

"We decline to take action at our own peril."

I agree, and I worry that the administration doesn't appear ready to take that action. I fear that we don't have the will to take action, and that worries me.

I find it some what egregious that the argument for learning to live with a nuclear Iran assumes that we must accept that they will have a nuclear weapon or that we should begin our approach to Iran as if they already had one.
Could it be because, well, everyone that actually has a nuclear power program can turn out a working device in 30-90 days? Japan, S. Africa(though they abandoned, they could go back quickly), one of the Viking country nations(forget which, but their whole program is deterrence by proxy), India(remember all that rumbling about how US help would mean proliferation? That wasn't just talking out of one's butt.), etc.

If one accepts that Iran has nuclear power one also accepts that they have, at least in potential just like Japan, nuclear arms. Period. Them's the facts.

Why are we precluding the prevention of those circumstances? Even unto military intervention of one stripe or another?
I'm not precluding anything. I'm just asking if it's smart and in our favor to buy cantelope for $9 of for $2, so to speak. Why pay more for something when I can get the same damn thing for a whole lot less. (But, apparently, that means I'm insane and not serious.)

Second, in making that acceptance a center of our approach, we elevate Iran far above its actual current station that is politically, economically and militarily inferior to the United States.
Or, perish the thought, alternatively, we could actually be accepting the reality on the ground: they are Numero Uno in the ME militarily and all that comes with it. We can start down a path of muscular confrontation, and all that that entails, or we can take a cheaper path that gets us to the same spot, accepts the facts on the ground, and takes a little longer.

This is national survival and the state should seek to have the strongest position possible to insure it can have the most options available in dealing with another state
Exactly, which is why you're talking out of your butt about detering them from obtaining nuclear weapons. It's the great equilizer. It's the only way they could ever really accept security garauntees from us or anyone else in the West. They've taken Teddy Rex to heart. They cannot be talked out of it, they can't be intimidated out of it, no economic carrots are going to be enough since for them it's national survival on the line.

You're a bit off with the initial Ayatollah, too. The Pasdaran aren't only the Iranian SOF, but also the Gestapo or the internal security forces of the USSR for the Mullahs. They don't like you, the Padaran makes you disappear. If Ahmedinejad and his rabble rousers were as powerful and a threat to the Mullahs like you claim he'd be dead. He's the Tragedian in Lewis' The Great Divorce. His chain gets shaken and he does his little monkey dance.
In a paradoxic twist, the Mad Mullahs may end up being the cautious moderates in the face of a resurgent revolution.
Nothing paradoxic about it. They understand that they are a nation-state, and have been since Jimmy decided to negotiate instead of replanting the Shah as gov't head(and, it's kind of hard considering that doing so would've given the Sovs good reason to get involved to support friends like the IRC who talked a "Liberation Islamism" line at the time). They've got Great Power concerns. They know what's up(and the guerilla warfare is a tool of great powers. That could be holding us up so that a Shia majority secures the Iranian left flank, and not some bit of Revolucion! idoelogy spreading as previously contended.).

I fear that we don't have the will to take action, and that worries me.

It isn't will. IT's resources. It's also brains. This may or may not be the best play. Far more serious study needs to be done before one makes this call. Whether one's kid is in it or not. YOu cannot forget the scale of misery you're unleashing here. If we can avoid that while still getting our way, predominately, why not?
Mussolini was right in that blood is the grease of history's wheels(it was said slightly differently in the play Major Barbara too) it's a question of how much, not if. Which was J's point from the other day, by and by.

Because the $2 canteloupe is rotten.

B) We’re All Going to Glow In The Dark

Let's just toss aside that Ike, when he first entered office, thought of nukes like bullets, just ordnance to be expended. Let’s forget that early in Ike’s tenure and his Sov counter part’s that threats were hurled fairly consistently over the use of nuclear arms. They were threatened in Korea, over the first Formosa Straight crisis and subsequent ones, and simply as hyperbole at times. But he changed his mind. He realized what he had in his hands, and his policy regarding them changed because of it. So did that of his Soviet counterpart.

But the Mullahs can't do that. They can't realize the horribleness of it. They can't possibly grasp that hitting Israel, which has had, tacitly, our nuclear umbrella extended over them, means that Iran disappears, forever; either by a ruthless campaign that would make Bomber Harris happy, or nuclear retaliation on a much smaller scale than Cold War levels. Yeah, they’re evil, and so that means they’re inherently and irredeemably stupid too. No, there’s no learning curve involved here at all and we can’t even entertain the idea that they might be capable of following the trail Eisenhower blazed at all. We need to just skip straight ahead, regardless of outcomes and costs measured in lives, to Party Time because, well, people are dying.

So it must be that some country winds up a burn-out cinder because Iran would wind up with nuclear weapons or that they’d wind up uncontested in their devious plots. Despite historical evidence to the contrary, that even a nuclear armed state’s cloak and dagger moves can be checked, we cannot even contemplate anything but a full fledged take down. That would be idiotic to do. Sit down, shut up, and hang on is the only acceptable approach so let’s not even waste the time on it, you collaborationist traitors you.

C) Proxy Wars Are Not As Good As The Real Thing

Let’s forget that what tolerated someone making a much more serious threat to the economic life’s blood that is what lays below the ME, with nuclear arms no less, and beat that back cheaply with proxy wars. Turning it into a complex dance of economics, industrial power, and low intensity armed conflict instead of a full-on clash that a Spartan Hoplite would love in all its Technicolor gore and glory (shock battle, baby!) was so stupid and not in our favor in the past so how ever could it be in our favor now? Hundreds of thousands dead directly, millions more indirectly, because we like the direct, “full mobilization of the nation” style of war more is such a smarter play that we shouldn’t even consider this possibility when contemplating what to do about Iran? I've been such a fool.

Last I checked though, we won because our plan was better.

It's not like we could ever accept them as central player in the ME, like we couldn’t accept Soviet control of Eastern Europe or Communists to control continental China for 50 years. It's not like we could ever leverage that to our advantage by having the conflict played out in other realms instead of the purely kinetic and physical one. I mean, bankrupting the enemy to win? It’ll never happen, stupid to contemplate, and a waste of our time. Make with the Great Power Warfare already, regardless of actual costs, people we like are dying.

Economic development and a take down from within (which PRC fears and the Soviet Union disappeared as a result of) has worked in the past. Proxy wars, simply holding someone up instead of stomping their guts out has worked in the past to prevent domination by those we consider evil and depraved. So it would be foolish to consider it now.

The costs of achieving said victories was much cheaper and more likely, when looked at the intact nature of the West and the East at the time of the end of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, via this route. Could the same be possible when talking about a nuclear- armed Iran? Is it possible that we could array forces, in the multiple spheres of conflict, to steer the confrontation to the end we desire like we have in the past? Of course not and it isn’t worth our time to consider the lower cost of lives in pursuing this. Naw, let's just have a Party at Ground Zero.

Sorry, but I’m not buying. Even if one ultimately chooses to do Iran, a full blown invasion because air strikes only kick the can down the road for a spell, you have to examine if it is the best play. If you’re trying to make an argument based on numbers of dead, hell, you’re likely to find you’re in quicksand since a war to end the Mullah-cracy, if one accepts the CW analogy originally adopted, is costlier than letting them be Numero Uno in the ME with nuclear weapons. How many civilians will die there? How many of our Service people will die there, considering that the Pasdaran (the Iranian SOF) *definitely* has taken notes from Iraq and is better equipped than the initial insurgency there? What, you don’t think they won’t fall back on a guerilla strategy?

Don’t forget that, yeah, we can do shadow war right back. We can ram it down their throats just as hard as they try to do it to us. Sure, the costs didn't disappear with this shift away from the direct and physical during the Cold War, but they were lower. Economic sabotage like the faulty computers to Russia is open to us. Cloak and dagger stuff. We can make them build, and build, and build with their very limited industrial base, pushing them to the brink of collapse just like we did for 45 years in the Cold War, with a much lower misery index, but that’s a play for losers. Yeah, this was such a losing play and it still is.

D) Quantity of Suffering and Death.

You want to talk death and suffering? Really? How about how many? That's the point of MAD and the Cold War, as Barnett talks about it, which doesn’t seem to be understood here, the issue of scale.

You'd rather we had particular and discrete conflicts where we talked about 500k casualties, if not more, in ten years instead of 50k in the same period, like Vietnam, and hundreds of billions of dollars of lost economic transactions that then has the ripple effect of millions more who die from 'lack of resources' (things like people dying from treatable diseases, contaminated food supplies because there's no development to do anything about it— the very same ripple effect grabbed onto to denounce the Cold War) because we’ve gutted the infrastructure (Seoul, Korea in 1953, but a bunch of them), instead of proxy wars. So, yeah, people want talk about it this way, fine. People want to deride the Cold War as not having changed anything for the better, fine. You own all of it though. You own the consequences of the alternate path, the blood bath that Roll Back would have been. You own a ruined Europe, some of it uninhabitable from BCW use. You own millions of refugees faced with no hope and mass starvation. You own it.

Same exists here with Iran. There are alternate pathways with different body counts at the end, as costs for traveling it. You accept responsibility for all of it and not just the stuff you like (kicking Iran's heiny), but all the consequences too and the ripple affects in totality as well. Own all of it. All of the dead and not just the one’s you want to accept in some arbitrary manner. All the misery and grief and kids dying from rickets and starvation because you found a classic von Clausewitz-ian fight of annihilation more palatable then a long shadow war, you VD Hanson lover you. Accept responsibility for all the stuff that gets glossed over when talk of being unable to accept a nuclear Iran because of body counts. You. Own. All. Of. It.

Digression: Do you actually feel better when you look at all the consequences of such a bigger, nastier level of war? Do you? I never have. In fact, I can’t ever seem to feel clean whenever I even contemplate this kind of Roll Back/Orgy of Blood type reasoning. It feels good for a few minutes, but when I work out the system of equations I start feeling like Lady Macbeth. So much blood, so much death, and there’s never enough soap to wash it away. End.

When doing the nasty Calculus of Death you don’t get to count only one side of the ledger. You have to do both sides, the whole system of equations. Scale matters. Even if it does make one an @55hole to consider scale.
--ry

� Secure this line!

Yeah, they’re evil, and so that means they’re inherently and irredeemably stupid too. No, there’s no learning curve involved here at all and we can’t even entertain the idea that they might be capable of following the trail Eisenhower blazed at all. We need to just skip straight ahead, regardless of outcomes and costs measured in lives, to Party Time because, well, people are dying.

and you are assuming that, gaining the nuclear weapon, they will, indeed, grow into this rational being. It's all guess work, compadre. Just looking at their current political affairs where anyone who even looks like or smells like a non IRGC "moderate" is being driven from office ought to give that entire argument a little more pause.

Along with the long held belief in martyrdom that they have supported and acted on in the last three decades.

I'm going by what they have done and you are hoping nuclear tech and/or weapons will suddenly make them something else.

Let's recap:

thousands of children and other non-military, walking across Iraqi mine fields carrying "the key to paradise".

Iranians letting lose with chem weapons that blew back into their own trenches.

That's two in one war and we're not talking about the 1950's when people didn't understand the power of nuclear weapons or the first expression of nuclear arsenals. We're talking about right now when it is well known and has existed for 70 years. Anyone still talking crazy about wanting it or using it and isn't "grown up" already is a serious danger.

for the rest of your argument, you'll have to wait, cause I'm trying to get ready for a conference call.

The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the - Web Reconnaissance for 05/30/2008 A short recon of what’s out there that might draw your attention, updated throughout the day...so check back often.

Then there was the question of possibly 3,000 al Quds forces from Iran mixing with Hezbollah. True or propaganda from one side or the other? Considering Iraq, take the number of Al Quds with a grain of salt, but believe that there are likely a significant number of Al Quds coordinators, trainers and liaisons within Hezbollah.

Smith wrote on September 29:

Hezbollah is rehearsing for something big here. Not sure what or when. But a few days ago, between 4,000 and 5,000 HezB gunmen deployed to the Christian areas of Beirut in an unsettling “show of force,” positioning themselves at road intersections and other key points throughout the city. Two additional objectives were achieved: First, the operation served as a probing action to determine local reaction. Second, it served as an exercise to gauge the time required (speed, synchronization, etc.) to achieve the key points and intersections.

Smith wrote an apology for not verifying all his sources and not using key words appropriately. NRO let him go. He wrote a clear explanation as to what occurred. Something he wrote about the disputed Hezbollah "deployment", caught my eye:

One of my detractors said this event, “simply never happened,” because “every journalist in town would have pounced on that story, and he’s the only one who noticed?” Another detractor said that “on the day that Smith says Hezbollah 'deployed' to East Beirut, I was doing some shopping.”

Frankly, I too was surprised that I was the only one who learned of it. And there were other amazing stories that other journalists should have “pounced on” while I was in Lebanon. But they did not. And I’m not sure why.

Smith knew why and so does anyone who actually watches the Middle East and this part of it particularly. The Palestinian Authority can tell you why. The Israelis can tell you why. It is very simple: Hezbollah and the militia have become just another backdrop, another crowd of people who routinely go about a Middle Eastern country with kefiyahs covering their faces, walky talkies and small arms. They are just part of the scenery.

That is exactly how Hezbollah and other groups with similar modis operandi like it. They want to blend in, they want the people to become complacent. It is classic shaping activities for military action. Routinely move your forces around in large and small movements so that your enemy begins to see them as nothing more than routine and non-threatening. This way, when you actually do deploy your forces to strike, the enemy will not be pre-pared and will be slow to respond, giving your forces the distinct advantage of first strike and momentum.

As Smith noted, the "deployment" at the time was simply men, standing on street corners with walky talkies. Nothing too threatening. No fire arms or other weapons. He distinctly put the words "show of force" in quotation marks to indicate that it was a movement of men, but with few weapons and with no actual move to violence. Of course, the numbers were reported to him by an internal security source. He did not personally count them or confirm with another source, which is what his critics aimed for when they disputed his claims. Then he wrote:

Amazingly, there was no response from the police or the army.

There was nothing amazing about it. No one responded, not even journalists, because they became, in a word, complacent. Two to five men on a street corner with walky talkies was "normal". They didn't stop traffic or block the streets. They didn't shoot anyone. I'm sure it never interrupted the one reporter's shopping trip.

Smith wrote in his explanation:

I also said, Hezbollah was rehearsing for something big. Not sure what or when.

Fact is, it was widely reported in the international press a few weeks later -- after I had returned to the States -- that Hezbollah deployed in the thousands south of the Litani River. And though the question of whether it was an actual deployment or a paper deployment was brought into question, it is today widely accepted that the exercise did take place.

And though I was obviously correct, I did not have a crystal ball when I said “Hezbollah is rehearsing for something big here.”

Yes, and his crystal ball could not tell him that, even after the Litani Hezbollah deployment, that was not the end nor the expected place of deployment. It was simply a good place and a good way to rehearse the first phase.

That, in fact, is exactly what is going on now. Totten and others have indicated that this is the start of the Third Lebanese Civil War. But, the first one never really ended. Hezbollah says that it is moving out of Beirut and handing it back to the Lebanese Army after days of blocking roads, burning tires and taking out many of the opposition forces and offices. Quietly, right in front of the faces of the people, the army, the journalists and everyone else that is watching.

Still, this is just a shaping exercise not the actual battle.

In short, what happened in West Beirut was a given. According to a report from the pro-Hezbollah Lebanese paper Al-Akhbar, this coup had been planned well in advance and its mastermind was the recently assassinated Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh. The government may in fact have forced Nasrallah to show his hand at a time of its choosing, not his. Hezbollah's walkover in Beirut came as a surprise to no one; nor did the performance of the army, except perhaps the Bush administration which must now reconsider the amount of money it has spent on equipment and training for the Lebanese Armed Forces

This is to pressure the Parliament into selecting the President that Hezbollah wants. A pro-Syrian, pro-Iranian Hezbollah ally.

If they don't get it, the Lebanese now know what Hezbollah can do: they can take over Beirut in a New York minute and no one will stop them.

� Secure this line!

I have firsthand knowledge of what happened and I can say that Thomas Smith was not 'let go' by NRO. He left on his own in order to shield NRO from the attacks, and as I understand they are still on very friendly terms

What happened to Smith was a travesty. It was poltically motivated, and as has been reported possibly orcehstrated by Hezbollah sympathizers. Smith's attackers literally conceived dates and times for things that Smith never said, and said he had reportedly 'seen' that which he never said he saw.

In short... the Leftwing media and bloggers lied to silence him. According to many experts, they had to.

But Smith is one of the toughest and bravest soldiers I have ever known, and he continues to report the truth and fight the fight.

The recent conflict in Lebanon stemmed from a disclosure about Hezbollah's extensive telecom network.

Nobody reported or even knew about this until a few weeks ago.

But Thomas Smith was reporting it 8 months ago.

1) Lawrence notes, immediately, that he is talking about bedouins and not urban populations. They require something else. Iraq's population is largely existent in urban centers. the problem would have been if we had concentrated only on securing Baghdad (as we did in the beginning) and not any other population centers. Baghdad would have been Medina.

Strangely, though, it turned into Zarqawi's Medina. The why of it is very simple and applies to the greater reason why Iraq and Baghdad are important.

Historically, Baghdad has been the center of the Islamic empire for many more centuries than Istanbul. It has a significance, both historically and ideologically, for any group, be that Al Qaida or Shi'ite Tehran. Much more so for the AQ variety because a good portion of their ideology is based on both real and mythological history. (One reason that they resemble Nazis and their quest for the third Reich).

I would say that, simply put, to lose Baghdad or to never gain it, is to lose Baghdad permanently. For the Salafists, anyway. The Iranians, if they are at all pragmatic, would consider the back door approach through politics and economic ties would give them leverage at a later date to "win" Baghdad.

2) One might note that the Bedouins of Lawrence's time had a significant advantage over, say, foreign fighters. Aside from the fact that they came from the tribes that were banned together, you can't say that the Bedouins drove into villages and massacred all the local people in horrific ways. Unlike, say, the AQ folks or even some of the hold overs from the Ba'ath or their own.

In fact, historically, it's the Turks that are more comparable to the AQ types in that regard. I recall two memorable moments, highlighted in the movie on Lawrence, both circling around the massacre of innocent villagers. One results in Lawrence, et al, attacking a column of Turks and giving back as good as the Turks had given. The second is the Bedouin who charges the Turks by himself. The shiehk explaining that the man was the last of his tribe that was earlier massacred by the Turks.

In short, there are some parallels, but it would take a pick up stick master to put all the pieces in some sort of context from the historical acts of others compared to recent acts to come up with a true comparison.

But, reversing what Bateman said, had the Bedouin set about massacring anyone they thought was even remotely connected to the Turks, threatened any tribe or village that had not joined them against the turks with complete destruction, etc. Would they have received the same protection and been revered as the liberators?

And, if the Turks had, instead of putting their boots further on the necks of the Arabs, in turn protected the populations and tribes from these roving bands of criminal murderers, then we would have had a Mao moment.

You know, where Mao explains that, if a guerrilla army cannot turn itself into an actual army with its discipline and real political concepts accepted by the population, they would be considered roving bandits that prey on the population, not legitimate representatives of the aspirations of the people.

If I was looking for a parallel to Iraq, that would be much closer to reality.

But...

3) Who's Medina is Iraq? Who has to own it at all costs? Many here are certain that it is not the United States. That may be true, but I have rarely, if ever, seen anyone talking about why anyone else, rather AQ or Tehran might need to own Iraq.

In fact, AQ spent a lot of human, material and monetary resources to gain Iraq. To no avail, it would seem.

Does the United States lose out in its long term goals or does it win? I'm not talking about Iraq. I am talking about the long term goal to discredit, disrupt and, ultimately, destroy Islamic terrorism. Or, more succinctly, the Salafist ideology that foments the the kind of terrorism we have been subjected to.

I am not going to say that its perfect or that that long term goal is simply met and succeeded in Iraq, but it is an excellent start.

To round out that comment at Small Wars, AQ has not only made Iraq and Baghdad an ancient historical point of their ideology, but, more recently, in 1998, Osama made Iraq a center of his grievances. When we went there, AQ could not ignore our presence. It became a point of necessity, of proof of their ideological imperative.

They lost. But, equally importantly, whether democratic and free or whatever, Iraq as an ally, friendly to the west, becomes a thorn in the sides of both the AQ and Tehran, even if Baghdad is equally or somewhat friendly to Tehran.

So, in context to our long term goals, whose Medina is Iraq?

� Secure this line!

Laurence, while a good movie, was not a big stregic ploy. Mostly tactical to pin down as many Turks as possible for two main reasons. One, to keep the Turks off balance after their defeat and retreat at the Canal and two, to syphon off as many troops as possible from the Galipoli front that was quickly becoming a mess.

The Brits armed the Arabs with light arms and as shown in the movie light artillery. These were tribes, many different tribes, more interested in finding and controlling water. The Turkish influence on their daily life was not great. Big oil wasn't going to be discovered for another 20 years and France and Britan just replaced the Turks as the overall administrators. That's the way countries controlled markets back then...you took them over. The French, British, Dutch, German (before the war) colonial systems were huge. They controlled commerce both ways and took a slice out of every middle. Our Revolution was more about the ability to sell Cod fish on the open market then having to tranship all catches through a wholesaler in Britain.

If while drilling for water they found water instead of all that black goo they didn't want and couldn't use, events for Laurence would have been less then tactical. His main purpose was to screen the canal and keep the Turks off balance, not build countries and empower the Arabs.

Just think of what would have happened if the Brits were able to force the Straights and supply Russia and keep them in the war with the Czar in power.

I can't believe I'm even remotely defending this piece by Bateman.

Kat, the point of the piece was that Iraq is a tool by which Iran keeps us tied down and wasting resources so we can't go after them or go on the offensive elsewhere. Which is the great failing of the piece since it sets up a different pathway under which a) attacking Iran ends the influence they have in Iraq. Simply realize that they're stinging us along by the nose and shift to the real target, the real head of the snake or b) cutting deals with Iran stops all the nonsense.

Which, is rather wrong. Iran's part of the problem, but not all of it. Doing Iran doesn't fix the problems in Iraq for which Iran isn't culpable.

But, if you accept that Iran is doing proxy war stuff, then, yeah, he's mostly right. By doing that they tie up massive numbers in a perversion of the '3:1' rule.

The rest of it is just nitpicky. The main thrust was US and Iran, not Iraq as itself. Complaining that his analogy isn't 100% accurate isn't going after the central idea, which is the only thing of real consequence here: Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants.

They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)

oo "analogies, not xeroxes" I'm going to xerox that one.

I dunno I think Kat brings up a fair point. To the question "whose Medina is Iraq?" I think Iran is not the answer. AlQ and the US to a degree yes but both can afford to loose it and/or could extend their reach further if desired. Pakistan in an odd way maybe. The US' real problem is political which is derived from domestic will. But I have no doubt the US could do more if it was felt to be needed. AlQ has also sunk a lot into Iraq and I don't feel they could say it yields much good for them. However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.

Iran isn't the end all be all of ending instability in Iraq since Iran cannot plunge the country into civil war whenever it wants.

They're called analogies, not xeroxes.(Aieeee, my ear, owie, owie, owie.)

One, he talks about Iran, but very off handedly. I didn't think he really identified who or what equated to "bedouins". Also, yes, I would agree with you, that anology stunk because the bedouins didn't have any fixed assets. Iran does. Thus, you are correct, if we just wanted to stop this nonsense, we could drop some heavy water on Tehran and be done.

But, since he didn't really specify who or what (or if everyone) benefited from our being tied up in Iraq, I went down the list of immediate potential beneficiaries and it ends up with two: Iran and AQ. Secondary beneficiaries might be a whole host of nations who have turned Iran into their proxy (like DPRK, Russia, China, etc).

But, if you get back to the main antagonists, it's Iran and AQ. Thus, as argent notes my final question: Who's Medina is Iraq?

However AlQ is not structured like a nation they are more well viral. They can regrow in other places, independently even, with a new name probably, as long as the local situation is sufficiently aligned. Which is the real war. The local alignment.

I agree, but there is one part that always slips by us when we are talking about the necessities of having to win a particular battle or not and that is where fanatical ideology comes in.

Our enemy is sometimes rational and sometimes not. They really do resemble Nazis in the regard that they tie certain strategic necessities to their ideological demands. Baghdad isn't just the place that the US is and where we provide big targets in the form of our military or even where we could be held down and made to spend ourselves stupid.

Baghdad and, by extension Iraq, are part of their entire ideology that insists on the re-institution of the caliphate. Now, whether that is plausible or not is neither here nor there, but when their entire ideology is based on real or mythological history, their entire existence depends on their ability to make that ideology a physical and political reality. I believe fully that this reason is the number one reason why Zawahiri continues to tell the would be jihadists that the primary battle front is in Iraq.

In terms of the top reasons why I would not want to give up Iraq, that would be #1. When we detroy their history, we destroy their ideology.

We are stealing their history right now and they can't stop us.

Kat, it appears to this Very Grumpy Old Vet, you have this thing about finding the most dense briar patch and you walk right through the middle of it. Anybody with any common sense walks around it, but they miss some very important truths, in doing so. Thank you.

To get to your subject, my concern with this whole conflict is this. We are starting to look at this conflict as THE model for all modern warfare. This present strategy will work in this region primarily because of the Bedouin Code. This code is not universal, but region-specific. The big thing is to keep a conventional force with a COIN option.

You raise the issue of Iran. I believe they are looking at this situation in many ways. They see the Americans in the two countries on its borders, human shields. These conflicts are draining people, money and weapons. This is everything they want, without the grief. The character you want to watch is Sadr. He figures he is playing it smart. He's got his fingers in just enough things that he can control them. Eventually, he'll become the new Saddam. I guess this is just the way things are, and we just need to accept them. Or do we? Kat, did you read the script, as you can tell, I surely haven't seen it. The old Sea Hag, named, "History" may just have a completely different view. For all I know, "History" may show Sadr just "hanging" around off some bridge. I think we have him some 90 year-old spinster virgin school-teachers to have with him for all of eternity.

Kat, Thank you, for all your hard work.

Grumpy

Actually, I apparently have a very different read of Bateman than you do, Kat(not in the face, not in the face). Bateman *did* say toward the end who the Bedo, Brits, etc are in the last paras I thought. The Brits are Iran(they're benefiting from Lawrence's work), the Bedo are the various insurgents that Iran may/may not be supporting in Iraq(they're the people doing the grunt work as the BEdo were for Britain), and the Coalition forces, mostly the US, are the Turks(who're beeing bled white or dispersed to hell and gone). IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear.

So I didn't see you walking into the Briar Patch(as Sir Grumpy did) so much as being really nit-picky as if this were a lit-crit mag or something.

So, I'm cornfused as to what you did or didn't see. Maybe i ought to go read it again?

Kat and Ryan, my point about the "Briar Patch" is this, Ryan, you are the same. Both of you, you do your homework and try to deal with some very tough issues. You are both shedding light into some into some very areas.

Thanks, to both of you,

Grumpy

IRan gets what it wants very cheaply. Very Liddel-Hart-ish and Sun-Tzu-ish strategy of the indirect. I thought that was fairly clear.

So, you must wonder why we give them what they want? And, I don't necessarily mean that we leave, but what other options to do we have?

I would say that, while they are thinking in the lines of keeping us from physically attacking them, that may never have been in the cards. Or, at least, not in this decade. I may be mistaken, but the point of the strategy to "drain the swamp" was not simply to draw in jihadists and kill them on end.

Democracy, freedom. Two borders of Iran, as you pointed out in an earlier post, are now with whole different governments sitting on them. And, all the smuggling does not go one way.

Let us not imagine that there is not strategic gain here that has real long term benefits in our total regional or global strategies to change terrorist supporting states.

Aren't we always arguing that this is not always necessarily done at the pointy end of a missile?

I just blessed off on the four Iraqi stick-jockeys who came here to have their Instrument Instructor skills honed and evaluated. [names, ranks and squadrons redacted] all of them smacked their simulated birds into the simulated ground the first time I put them IMC, but they were "flying" an unfamiliar airframe. By the second hour, they were over being sim-sick and ready to go. No problem with their basic flying skills -- all were at least as good as the US helicopter pilots with the same flying hour level, and they all have multiple-thousand hours of stick time.

After the second sim period, I briefed them on attitude indicator failure and how to keep right-side up using only the non-electric instruments -- basically, the same things the pioneer mail pilots used in the 'Thirties. For the first two minutes, they were a bit shaky, but after they got their scan adjusted, they were good -- *very* good, in fact. After they landed, I got everybody outside for a break and one of them said, "Now I know why the Mi-17 crashed." He was on the IqAF investigation board.

Originally, everybody I talked to said all the IqAF pilots had zero instrument skills, but what I saw makes me call bullshit on that. These four were just plain *good* at instruments.

The Iraqi pilot continued, "When you started talking about the attitude indicator, I didn't realize you meant the artificial horizon, then when you failed it, I suddenly realized. And then I realized what killed the Mi-17 crew. I *knew*.

"In American helicopters, the little airplane stays still and the artificial horizon moves up and down and sideways. It is opposite with Russian artificial horizon -- the horizon stays still and the little airplane moves up and down and sideways.

"The Mi-17 has *Russian* artificial horizon."

The Iraqi Mi-17 pilots got their instrument training in the Huey. When they took off, they were nose-low -- *all* helicopters take off nose-low, it's the only way to get the beasts in the air, The little airplane on the artificial horizon went to the bottom of the gauge, as it was designed to do, and when they went IMC, the frikkin' Russian attitude indicator made them believe they were still straight and level for the first couple of seconds. By the time they got their scan going, they were still in a dive, probably only fifty feet above the ground.

Crunch.

I sent each one of the students off with a packet of instrument training pubs and slides. Got a couple of squadron patches in return -- [redacted] flies the Mi-17.

On a related note (related to oft-cited US opinion of Iraqi flying skills based on Gulf I and OIF), I think we might be painting with too broad a brush. [names and units redacted] flew fighter-bombers in Iran-v-Iraq and both had their bacon saved by the US Navy. The Aegis picket ships (who painted everything within 500 miles or so) would often give egressing Iraqi aircraft notice of bandits closing on their locations. When DS kicked off, most of the Iran-v-Iraq vets decided they weren't going to shoot up people who'd previously saved their asses -- but if they'd flat out refused to fly, they would have been shot; if they flew to Syria, they thought they'd be shot down by the Iraqi ADA ring oriented on Israel; they couldn't go to Turkey because Turkey was a Coalition partner. So, they went to Iran, got thrown in jail and beaten up for a while, and then were released at the end of hostilities. Most of the non-flying done in OIF was due to the Saddam's Got Control of the Situation Syndrome, but a bit of it was Iran-v-Iraq vets -- fixed- and rotary-wing -- hot-starting engines on purpose and frying them to ground the aircraft.

How much is true and how much is eyewash for the old gringo? Dunno, but both Su-7s on display here have slag for engine guts.

Now, before you lump me for telling tales out of school, consider the following:

1. The Iraqi board *knew* that spatial misorientation killed the Mi-17 crew, but they couldn't figure out *why* -- all the instruments were working normally and the crew, although inexperienced, had instrument training. Knowing the *why* won't change the causal findings, but it'll take a smidgeon of the onus off the dead pilots.

2. That's not the first time I've heard stories about what went on in the Gulf during Iran-v-Iraq -- just the first time I've heard them from the ones who were warned.

And now Dusty provides the coda:

"He's right about the Russian ADIs...they are the reverse of our design and VERY difficult to use the first time you try (given my MiG-23 sim experience in Hungary)...check that--it's impossible the first time. Everything is exactly backwards in the fixed-wing aircraft, i.e., what looks like a right bank in a US attitude indicator is a left bank in a Russian one, etc. If the little airplane moved as they say, that would be OK, but the ones I saw were out-and-out nauseatingly difficult to decipher.

As far as foreign pilot skills go, every fight I've ever been associated with assumes every SOB on the other side is an Eric Hartmann about to be unleashed. If they turn out to be less-than, so much the better. Then again, ask Randy Cunningham (on visitors' day) about Major Tomb.

I'm not surprised they are good pilots...they just flew in an air force owned by an a$$hole."

And to top it off - this might be the first "Marquee Post" where all the headliners of this space contributed something!

� Secure this line!

Wow. That is some fascinating stuff. Thanks so much for sharing it!

A question: So the Iraqis are training on one style of artificial horizon, then using another style for operations? Was that something that nobody had picked up on?! If so, is anything going to be done to align the training and operational equipment?

Wow... talk about a lightbulb moment.
You're right: It makes perfect sense now. Damn.

I think that goes along with Iraq now purchasing american weapons, etc.

I wonder how difficult it is, institutionally speaking, to overcome problems like the one you described? Up in the snowy, white north, we get people arguing all the time that we should be buying relatively cheap Russian or even more expensive European kit (especially aircraft). The example usually cited is the Indian military, which buys from whomever they can.

I wonder what a hodgepodge of equipment like that does to your safety, interoperability, orphan stock costs, and training costs?

Damian,
This story is EXACTLY what happens when you get a hodgepodge of equipment. Tragic.

Well, it's what happens if you can't maintain some structural separation.

Back when I weont on my final trip to the Sandbox for saber rattling, Operation Desert Thunder, the Kuwaiti Army had a brigade each of Pact gear, French gear, and US gear, and kept track of it that way. They didn't swap people out from unit to unit willy-nilly.

But it certainly complicates things, no matter how you manage it.

This also brings up an interesting additional facet concerning when people accuse the US of aiding Iraq against Iran back in the day.

In real life, actions have both negative and positive consequences. People who either focus all on the negative or the positives, to the exclusion of the real deal, are bombs waiting to go off if you strap them to your mission payload.

And they're not going to go off when you think they are going to go off either.

Such people make an extreme disaster of operations, precisely because they either look at America's support of Iraq and try to use it to destroy America's support of Iraq in the here and now by overplaying the negatives, or they look at the so called "positives" of cheap, inaccurate, "better" Russian hardware for the Iraqis in order to discount the advantage of interoperability and training which would come from getting the Iraqis the M-16 family of armaments.

Russia's quality control seems to be rather weirdly different to AMerica's, if not in the suckage compartment. Their industrial or technological base isn't the problem, it's the way they do quality control. Take a look at how they maintain, or rather don't maintain, their nuclear armaments. Which is probably why their most popular armaments like the Ak 47 don't need quality control because they have low tolerances. The popular refrain seems to be that you could bury an AK 47 underground for years, dig it back up rusted and gunky, then fire it off. It won't be very accurate though...

Little things like making the artificial horizon more intuitive, doesn't really seem to factor in for the Russians compared to the American or Western obsession with making things more streamlined and intuitive. Different philosophies, different methodologies.

For people, whether Leftists or not, just interested in the minor tactical advantages of Russian arms and their lack of a need for maintenance, are ignoring the logistical question. It's one thing if it is a tactical choice between more firepowr and less firepower. It is one thing if it is a tactical choice between weapons that work and weapons that just don't work even if you did everything you could to clean them, sort of like VIetnam plastic rifles. But this is a difference between solidifying American and Iraqi logistics by cutting out foreign equipment, or stay as we are while we try to get the Iraqis logistically independent of us.

Better logistics in the lnog run is always better than any slight improvements in tactics that could be effected, in my view.

On another note, it is always fascinating to see the perspective from another party in a warfare, rather than your own. Makes learning things faster.

Damien wrote:

wonder how difficult it is, institutionally speaking, to overcome problems like the one you described? Up in the snowy, white north, we get people arguing all the time that we should be buying relatively cheap Russian or even more expensive European kit (especially aircraft). The example usually cited is the Indian military, which buys from whomever they can.

You could go with the Israeli model and buy the A/C w/o instruments, and install your own

This is the first I’ve written about the Iraqi Air Force Mi-17 Crash last month. I didn’t personally know Staff Sergeant Chris Frost, the US Air Force Gunner who was killed in the crash, but do I remember seeing him whenever I was up at Taji. I had the highest respect for the USAF gunners and pilots who flew with and trained the Iraqi Airmen. Those men and women are the unsung heroes of the US effort to rebuild the Iraqi Air Force. I worked with several Iraqi Air Force Mi-17 crewmen, so odds are I knew some of those who were lost in the crash. I wanted to wait until the official report was released before discussed the situation. After reading the comments to this post regarding the after action report, I couldn’t remain silent. I’m very proud of the Iraqi Air Force, and proud of the Airmen of the United States Air Force who are training their fellow Iraqi Airmen.

The Iraqi Air Force does not have a 'hodgepodge' of equipment as is assumed by many. Their Mi-17 fleet, though currently small, will triple in size over the next couple of years. The Iraqi leadership chose to purchase more Mi-17s because they're good at flying them, and their maintainers are very experienced working on them.

We pushed the Hueys on them because the Huey II is an excellent helicopter and we could bring them in faster than the Mi-17s. We almost convinced the Iraqis to purchase another 30+ Huey II’s last fall, but the Iraqi Air Force rightfully decided they should stick with what they're good at and purchased more Mi-17s.

Ironically last August when I was ordering the Mi-17s for the IqAF I was asked by the Iraqi Air Staff time after time to make sure the helicopters had two modern radar altimeters, something not standard on the Mi-17. I was told that during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 80+ helicopters crashed in the early morning darkness enroute to Kuwait because their altimeters were sub-par. The Iraqi leadership still remembers that lesson, and they stressed the importance of ordering only the best altimeters for their helicopters. I did just that. The new fleet that is inbound this year will be modified immediately after they leave the Russian assembly line by a US company. They will all have the appropriate altimeters, and hopefully a tragedy like this won’t happen again.

As for the transition from Hueys to Mi-17s being a contributing factor in the accident, what else could the Iraqi Air Force do? The Hueys were the only operational helicopters available to the Iraqi pilots first, so most pilots trained on them. The ones who transitioned to the Mi-17 were limited to flying inside the perimeter of their base because of a lack of defensive systems and trained gunners. Once those limitations were overcome, the Iraqis began flying operational Mi-17 missions outside the wire with great success.

Their first missions were to Basra last fall. They did an outstanding job and the crews quickly learned to adapt. The flight that crashed this March was flying north of Mosul, something the Iraqis haven't done in years, but they had to fly up there to provide the support their nation is asking of them. The Iraqi Air Force sortie rate increased from 30 per week in January 2007 to 300 per week in December 2007 because the Iraqi government desperately needs organic air power in the Counter-insurgency war they are fighting. This ‘surge’ in air power will most likely double throughout 2008, so the pressure is on for the US and Iraqi Airmen to train, equip, and join the fight.

Are the pilots inexperienced? Some of them. Are they learning and adapting quickly? Absolutely. Are our US Air Force pilots training the Iraqi pilots to the same standards as we train our own. You bet. Still, it's a new, young Air Force. No matter how many obstacles you overcome in your training and maintenance, mistakes will still happen and lives will tragically be lost.

And remember, the Iraqi Pilots and Crewmen are all learning how to operate in a combat environment, which makes this entire enterprise even more difficult and costly. They’re dodging small arms, missile fire, sand storms, and a “quazi-free for all” VFR combat air space while they’re learning how to fly in an operational capacity.

Yet they're still flying, and we're still training them. Why? Because no nation can be secure without Airpower, and the Iraqis have always known this. It's just taken us 4 years to finally do something about it.

I worked directly for the Iraqi Air Force for 6 months, and I'd do it again if called upon. Our Air Force is doing an outstanding job growing and developing what once was, and soon will be again, one of the most respected Air Forces in the region.

Just to be clear, El Capitan, Bill, Dusty and I were being *supportive* of the Iraqis, and not critical. That said...

Your information is illuminating. Thanks!

El Capitan, no disrespect was intended in my remarks. Canadian Forces aircraft are currently all American in pedigree, but we are constantly being pushed to buy something other than U.S. designs. I have concerns about mixing and matching, and was honestly asking for feedback, given that this post made me reflect on an issue that touches my military, but also quite a number of others.

Same here.
The point is that training on American helicopters and then flying Russian helicopters seems to be an issue due to the instrument panel differences. That's what was meant by hodgpodge- not that they have shoddy equipment, or that they're trying to put Russian parts in American copters or visa versa. And no one is saying that the IrAF pilots are incompetent- quite the opposite. After you read Bill's AAR, you understand exactly how this kind of thing could easily happen.

It's like driving in America your whole life, and then renting a car in England for a week's vacation- you're bound to screw up the right-sided steering, or at least struggle with it. Being in the air has far more dire consequences though.

This is why I am a landlubber and don't like heights and don't like to fly and and and...WOW.

I am impressed. This is Good Stuff.

Damian
The Forces may purchase American sourced equipment, but it is not USAF or USN standard. Back in the 80's we lost three Hercs and were offered replacements by Lockheed at a must-buy price. The aircraft were sitting unsold at the factory; the price to be charged was for the bare airframe. Unfortunately, the aircraft would have required partial stripping to remove the wiring/electronics and install the RCAF standard kit. The rebuild would have brought the acquisition cost up to the price of a Herc purchased the 'normal' way, which the Air Force could not afford.

There's a company in Kelowna which tries to sell Russian hels to the Air Force, but their aircraft are fitted with Canadian standard avionics, not Russian.

Cheers

The Forces may purchase American sourced equipment, but it is not USAF or USN standard.

Uh...yeah...which is why I purposely used the phrase "American pedigree." Are you forgetting I've actually flown in most of them?

Here's where I get to live down to the name of my site.

Bill, Bill, Bill... you and John threw a party and you didn't even invite me?

A** smacking, light hearted electronic bondage... err... badinage...???? Great goodly moogly!

A girl could really get her pert little nose out of joint :p

/flouncing off

SCOOOORE!!!!

Cricket, Ymar and Cassie in the same thread!

Heh. Given what Cassie came here for... I doubt it was a pert *nose*...

They’re dodging small arms, missile fire, sand storms, and a “quazi-free for all” VFR combat air space while they’re learning how to fly in an operational capacity.

Substitute "torrential rain" for "sandstorms" and you've got Vietnam. We lost a lot of helicopters *there* due to weather-related accidents before we taught ourselves how to survive.

That lesson wasn't lost on the Iraqi Air Force, either -- which is why they insisted that us rotary wing instructors have an Army Aviation background, rather than a USAF one.

When the Flight School Commander found out that two of us *were* Vietnam helicopter vets, he was ecstatic...

John, Damian, AFSister... my apologies if I sounded a little gruff on that comment. Guess I'm still a little emotionally attached to the folks out there, as well as their mission. Hard to leave for home when you're so attached to the mission.

Thanks for putting the good word out on this situation and the many others out there that go unreported.

Cheers!
EC

Basra sits on some of Iraq's largest oil and natural gas reserves. During the 2003 invasion, troops were sent to immediately secure these fields and keep them from being sabotaged as Saddam had done in 1991 in Kuwait and Southern Iraq during his retreat after Desert Storm. These fields and the infrastructure are sorely dilapidated due to the long war with Iran, Desert Storm and the subsequent sanctions that not only limited materials and money that could be spent on this infrastructure, but also allowed Saddam and his cronies to pocket billions without ever investing in the one significant supporter of Iraq's economy: oil.

The Bush Administration had made significant plans with Haliburton and several other US oil companies to immediately take control and operate these oil fields and refineries. It was one of the legs of a plan that insisted that Iraq would be able to eventually pay its own way, to pay for its own security and reconstruction, through the proceeds from its oil sales. The condition of this infrastructure made the task daunting. The oil fields are, as of today, five years after the invasion, just beginning to meet and exceed pre-war production levels at 2.6 million barrels per day. The EIA and others have projected that Iraq could be producing as much as 6 million barrels per day while others offer an optimistic projection of up to 10 million barrels per day. A significant increase both in the market and to Iraq's economy.

However, throughout the terror and insurgency, Iraq's oil infrastructure has taken a beating and the theft of oil, gasoline and other refined products has reached a point that it is taking a huge chunk of money out of the Iraqi government's pocket (possibly as much as $3 billion/year). The crime and damage to the infrastructure, including pipelines and terminals, along with a continuing delay in passing the hydro-carbon law has kept many potential investors away from Iraq.

In the new oil driven market, where a barrel of oil is now $113, the inability to develop and take part in the market is keeping Iraq from realizing billions of dollars in revenue that could go towards building other infrastructure and supporting other aspects of their economy such as agriculture and many state owned industries like cement (a huge market in the region with countries like Dubai and Oman importing millions of tons for their many building projects). Iraq's electrical power is also largely based on oil, gasoline and diesel driven power plants. These have been unable to sustain operations due to inconsistent delivery of fuel related to, in large part, the damage to pipelines, the theft of products at the pipelines, through skimming from shipments or outright hi-jacking. Much of this ends up on the black market which in turn fuels the insurgency, militias and criminal gangs.

The Iraqi government has been working on a hydro-carbon law since its inception in 2005. The law would both spell out the amount of revenue sharing with the central and provincial governments as well as the amount of ownership, investment and profit sharing with any investors or outside oil companies. While the law is pending, Iraq has gone forward with budgeting that allocates oil revenues throughout its national and provincial governments. It has also signed short term (up to two years) "service contracts" with several international companies including Total while approving 35 out of 120 companies to participate in future bids.

The CWC group is hosting an Iraq energy investment conference May 19th through May 21st in Dubai.

The theme of the conference is focused on the huge incentives to improve the investment climate in Iraq’s downstream sector and across the two days the conference will identify and explore the challenges facing the Iraqi oil industry.

There are three significant challenges to Iraq's oil industry today: the law that may or may not be conducive to foreign investment depending on its profit sharing models; the condition of the infrastructure and amount of investment needed to bring it up to par vs. potential profits; and, finally, security, since on going criminal and insurgent activities continue to damage infrastructure and take potential profits out of both the government and th investor's hands.

The multitude of schemes through which these criminal gangs and militias get their money is astounding and, frankly, a serious cause for concern for any company that assumes the risk or responsibility for maintaining, improving or increasing the infrastructure. "Criminals" blow holes directly into pipelines carrying gasoline or oil taking truckloads away to either be spirited across the borders to Iran or Syria (oil) or sold directly on the black market. Such pipelines then must be repaired either by the government or the company with the service contract, leading to millions in continuing repair outside of normal wear and tear.

Most gasoline and diesel is actually shipped into Iraq since it only has a few refineries capable of refining its heavy crude. Oil is shipped out and then returned as gasoline, diesel and kerosene via truck, train or pipeline. Tankers on trucks and trains are routinely "short filled" with the skimmed amount sold on the black market. Sometimes entire shipments are diverted or hi-jacked while others simply stop along the way and sell off part of their shipments. Some have reported that tankers have arrived with as little as a fourth of the amount their manifests indicated.

Other schemes include the state owned and subsidized gas stations that are operated by any number of people and organizations, some that are direct fronts or associated with the insurgency and criminal gangs. Subsidized gas is bought and delivered to these "stations", but much of it is sold on the black market, leaving little at the gas station for its actual intended consumers, forcing them to buy from the black market at a higher rate. In some cases, these stations don't exist or are never built or open, standing literally as "fronts" for black market operations. The government has decided to combat this by ending gasoline subsidies and forcing gas stations to buy the finished product at the market rate, nearly equal to the black market rate, making it less profitable.

Throughout these criminal enterprises, either through intimidation, graft or association, members of the criminal and militia organizations have infiltrated every aspect of the market from the management, to shipping and delivery, to labor. It has given them money to support various "aid" schemes where it buys loyalty through providing services such as housing, food, medicine and clothing. It has provided them with money to purchase weapons and loyalties that are, in turn, used to kill American and Iraqi security forces, weaken the central government, weakened the economy, Iraq's future reconstruction and, most importantly, caused major insecurity for its people.

The gangs and militias of the south lands down Basra way, particularly the Sadrists, are a very significant hindrance to Iraq taking the next step in its physical, economic and political security and stability.

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During the lead up to the first elections in 2005, SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq) now known as SIIC (Supreme Islamic Iraq Council - changed their name to distance themselves from the "Iranian" version), had returned triumphantly to the south. Sadr was much better known in Baghdad, Najaf and Karbala, but Basra had long been a SCIRI and DAWA (Maliki's party) stronghold where many had spent years transiting between Iran and Iraq, maintaining their connections. That party had been "invited" back by the US before the invasion and had connections that kept the Shia in the south out of the war.

As the elections approached, Sadr found himself relatively "out gunned" by Iranian backed, advised and financed SCIRI and DAWA parties, particularly in the south. He and his followers threatened to boycott the elections, just as the Sunni did, as a US rigged publicity stunt. In fact, he did boycott the elections, which meant that SCIRI and DAWA took many of the local provincial and city government seats. Sistani put pressure on both the SCIRI/DAWA and Sadr movements to maintain Shia unity to insure their dominance in the elections. SCIRI/DAWA gave Sadr thirty seats in the parliament, several ministries and cabinet positions and some provincial government seats. In exchange, Sadr did not oppose Maliki's selection as Prime Minister.

However, Sadr was not satisfied with this bargain. Down Basra way, the real money and political power lay. Um Qasr is the port, but Basra is the gateway city through which all commerce flows. Huge oil and natural gas fields populate the area along with large refineries and main pipelines. Cargo, imports, exports and every sort of legal and illegal goods came through either the port or through nearby points of entrance from Iran. Huge sums of reconstruction money along with political seats meant unmitigated wealth and power for whoever held the reins. Vincent wrote July 26, 2005:

Not surprisingly, given Basra's dilapidated condition, contracting is big business. Not only for the city's numerous contractors, but also for the crooked politicians, parasitical religious parties and criminal gangs who take their cut from every construction job, creating a business climate that combines the accountability of Tammany Hall with the law and order of 1920s Chicago.[snip]

Not that I didn't know anything about Basra-style corruption. In our travels across the city, Layla and I have fielded ceaseless complaints of extortion, protection rackets, employment featherbedding, nepotism, bid rigging, influence-peddling--it's impossible to talk to Basra businesspeople and not hear such woes. Mention, for example, the province's Governing Council and contractors will grimace, close their eyes and shake their heads. (One GC member oversaw a multi-million project to extend a street in downtown Basra; a year has gone by and so far no extension--meanwhile, the politician now lives in a $5 million home near the British Embassy.)

Then there was the highly-placed official in the Electrical Transmission Directorate who admitted to us that the government pays the notorious Garamsha tribe to protect high-voltage power lines from--well, the Garamsha themselves. A businesswoman complained that if you're not affiliated with a religious party, your low bid--even for projects involving international NGOs--will have difficulty finding acceptance. The owner of a cargo-hauling company described the port of Um Qasr as a veritable On the Waterfront-like scene of smuggling, theft and looting--which, when accused of complicity in the crimes, the former port manager blamed on--who else?--corrupt Americans.

With the Badr/SCIRI taking control of the public offices and doling out contracts to cronies and those who could afford to give some basheesh/kickbacks, Sadr went after the poor, undereducated and unemployed. He took over local mosques in extremely poor areas and took his message directly to the people. The Badr/SCIRI organizations gave him a ready made message where he denounced the corruption and thievery of the politicians, blaming the long and still painful poverty on the central government and the Americans.

Sadr concentrated on the laborers who were only able to get work through tribal or political connections. His followers joined the labor unions and the police, they became gangs of kidnappers, hi-jackers and shake down artists.

The people of Basra were squeezed somewhere in the middle by the two competing "Dons" of Basrah. If the gangs weren't stealing directly from the port, they were using their knowledge of convoys to alert militias for hi-jacking or ambushes, skimming oil and gasoline, extorting protection money (which didn't protect anyone from the gang down the road) and various other schemes to get money to both finance the insurgency and provide services to further recruit followers.

For the Iraq economy and the potential foreign investors, the ganglands of the south are an incapacitating obstacle.

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"..the relatively mainstream SCIRI.."

heh. never thought i would see them described like that.

Heh. Well, I think he was trying to convey how common, well entrenched, and part of the political process.

As opposed to Sadr who keeps milling about the edges and dipping his toe in the political process while blowing everyone up.

That's my interpretation anyway

There are political issues at hand, but the main issue has been Sadr using the Mahdi to hold up political progress at gun point. He has believed for some time that, either through popular support or repression of dissent through the use of the Mahdi, he has a significant chance of obtaining a much larger representation in the parliament and local elections.

His organization is premised on the idea that the Shia, representing the majority in Iraq, should be the rulers. Further, he has very little intent to give the Sunni any voice and little representation in government. His entire focus has been in keeping the Sunni out because he sees them as both the oppressors under Saddam and as the group responsible for killing thousands of Shia after the invasion during the long insurgency. Those who follow him or tacitly support him, believe the same.

The problem, of course, is that it does not recognize any Sunni grievances nor give any ground for negotiating a complete reconciliation and recovery of Iraq. He is barely considerate of any Kurdish concerns and believes the KRG (Kurdish Regional Government) and Kurdish Autonomous Region are illegitimate. He considers the Kurdish just short of traitors for effectively opening up the possibility of a federalized, three part Iraq with their demand for the new constitution written in 2005 to include a law providing three or more provinces ratifying "statehood".

He attacks the Iraqi security forces as "puppets" of the American occupation and he believes that the Americans brought Al Qaida and allowed the Sunni insurgency to attack the Shia. He was unhappy from the beginning of the invasion because, as he has stated several times, he believes that the Shia were on the point of rising and could have taken Saddam out by themselves, giving them the full power to rule. He believes the Americans would and have allowed the Ba'athists to continue to exist and enjoy some continuing power.

Through various means, including withdrawing his politicians from the cabinet, boycotting parliament, infiltration of the military and police, assassinations, intimidation, destruction of infrastructure, theft of oil and gasoline, hi-jacking convoys of goods both on the road and from the port, kidnapping contractors and third country nationals, and many more acts, Sadr and the Mahdi Army have attempted to keep the central government weak and support their movement with ill gotten gains. They have hoped that the government would collapse or parliament be disbanded through lack of confidence in order to gain their own political power through arms or through new elections or both.

Basra and Um Qasr by association, become the epicenter of all three issues: political, security and economics.

Basrah represents one of several economic regions within Iraq. In fact, it could be considered the premier economic center of Iraq since it sits on the main transport corridor for imports and exports through Um Qasr, the single Iraq sea port that is the busiest and most economically important transit hub in Iraq.

Every sort of goods from food to textiles to oil and gasoline passes through the port. There are two major oil platforms in the port that account for most of Iraq's oil exports and revenue. Refined oil products like oil, gasoline and diesel are returned through the port and transported by truck or train through Basrah and parts north.

According to Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I), Um Qasr:

“The estimated flow of goods into Iraq is 60,000 tons with 15,000 passing through UmQsar,” said Todd Stratton, Task Force to Support Business and Stability Operations in Iraq.

“The single largest commodity is food such as wheat, rice, sugar and other food items,” Stratton said. “The port is a critical gateway to supply the Iraqi nation with food imports.”

According to Stratton, the port has a grain silo that can process 7,500 tons a day with 5,000 tons being hauled away.

After the invasion in 2003, the United States awarded the contract to operate the port to Stevedore Services of America. The nearby port of Zubair was awarded to the Dutch company Maersk. Thousands of Iraqi dock workers and port operators from Um Qasr and near by Basrah were put out of work though they continued to receive their salaries from the government. In 2004, the CPA and transitional government reduced these salaries and pensions by a third. Workers attempted to organize, but a 1987 anti-union law enacted by Saddam was left to stand and the weak labor organization was pushed back, though not over by a long shot.

During this time, Sadr's organization was beginning to be a major issue. He disliked the transitional government and called for immediate, direct elections though under what governing structure and purpose was unknown. He considered the TA was full of outsiders who had not been in Iraq suffering persecution like he and others who remained. Likewise, he was skeptical, if not equally rejecting, the returned SIIC (SCIRI) and militia of the Badr brigade as both "foreign" and "Iranian" though he had not actually rejected Iranian money or guidance at the time or later.

The lack of immediate political and economic gains for the Shia underclass gave Sadr the onus he needed to create his Mahdi militia that eventually went toe to toe with American forces in Najaf throughout the summer of 2004. He used the discontent in Basrah and Um Qasr to subvert the legitimate complaints of the local unemployed and poor into his political movement.

In 2004, the labor movement in Um Qasr and Basrah gained strength and organization. Sadr's lieutenants infiltrated the movement, helped organize it, provided "security" and funneled money to the organizations. Eventually, the labor movement blockaded the port for three days and caused it to virtually shut down. Both Maersk and SSA left Zubair and Um Qasr siting "security issues". The ports were turned over to the Iraqi government which then negotiated with the local labor "union", putting thousands of laborers back to work, but also giving distinct power to Sadr's movement and the Mahdi militia over one of Iraq's most important economic hubs.

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In September, I described the fundamental nature of the conflict in Iraq as a competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This completion continues, influenced heavily by outside actors. And its resolution remains the key to producing long- term stability in Iraq .

Various elements push Iraq 's ethno-sectarian competition toward violence. Terrorists, insurgents, militia extremists and criminal gangs pose significant threats.

Al Qaeda's senior leaders, who still view Iraq as the central front in their global strategy, send funding, direction and foreign fighters to Iraq .

Actions by neighboring states compound Iraq 's challenges. Syria has taken some steps to reduce the flow of foreign fighters through its territory, but not enough to shut down the key network that supports Al Qaeda-Iraq. And Iran has fueled the violence, as I noted, in a particularly damaging way through its lethal support to the special groups.

Finally, insufficient Iraqi government capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust and corruption add to Iraq 's problems.

These challenges and recent weeks' violence notwithstanding, Iraq's ethno-sectarian competitions in many areas is now taking place more through debate and less through violence.

In fact, the recent escalation of violence in Baghdad and southern Iraq was dealt with, temporary (sic) at least, by most parties acknowledging that the rational way ahead is through political dialogue rather than street fighting.

As I stated at the outset, though Iraq remains a violent country, we do see progress in the security arena.

As this chart illustrates, for nearly six months, security incidents have been at a level not seen since early to mid 2005, though the level did spike in recent weeks as a result of the fighting in Basra and Baghdad . The level of incidents has, however, begun to turn down again, though the period ahead will be a sensitive one.

As our primary mission is to help protect the population, we closely monitor the number of Iraqi civilians killed due to violence.

As this chart reflects, civilian deaths have decreased over the past year to a level not seen since the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that set off the cycle of sectarian violence that tore the very fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and early 2007.

This chart also reflects our increasing use of Iraqi-provided reports, with the top line reflecting coalition and Iraqi data, and the bottom line reflecting coalition-confirmed data only.

No matter which data is used, civilian deaths due to violence have been reduced significantly, though more work clearly needs to be done.

Ethno-sectarian violence is a particular concern in Iraq , as it is a cancer that continues to spread if left unchecked. As the box in the bottom left of this chart shows, the number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence has fallen since we testified last September.

A big factor has been the reduction of ethno-sectarian violence in Baghdad , density plots for which are shown in the boxes depicting Iraq 's capital over time.

Some of this decrease is, to be sure, due to sectarian hardening of certain Baghdad neighborhoods. However, that is only a partial explanation, as countless sectarian fault lines in numerous mixed neighborhoods still exist in Baghdad and elsewhere.

In fact, coalition and Iraqi forces have focused along the fault lines to reduce the violence and enable Sunni and Shia leaders to begin the long process of healing in their local communities.

As this next chart shows, even though the number of high-profile attacks increased in March as Al Qaeda lashed out, the current level of attacks like this remains far below its height a year ago.

Moreover, as we have helped improve security and focused on enemy networks, we have seen a decrease in the effectiveness of such attacks. The number of deaths due to ethno-sectarian violence, in particular, has remained relatively low, illustrating the enemy's inability to date to reignite the cycle of ethno-sectarian violence.

The emergence of Iraqi volunteers to help secure their local communities has been an important development. As this chart depicts, there are now over 91,000 Sons of Iraq, Shia as well as Sunni, under contract to help coalition and Iraqi forces protect their neighborhoods and secure infrastructure and roads.

These volunteers have contributed significantly in various areas, and the savings and vehicles not lost because of reduced violence, not to mention the priceless lives saved have far outweighed the costs of their monthly contracts.

Sons of Iraq have also have contributed to the discovery of improvised explosive devices and weapons and explosive caches. As this next chart shows, in fact we have already found more caches in 2008 than we found in all of 2006.

Given the importance of the Sons of Iraq, we're working closely with the Iraqi government to transition them into the Iraqi security forces or other forms of employment. And over 21,000 have already been accepted into the police or army or other government jobs.

This process has been slow but it is taking place, and we will continue to monitor it carefully.

Al Qaeda also recognizes the significance of the Sons of Iraq, and AQI elements have targeted them repeatedly. However, these attacks, in addition to AQI's use of women, children and the handicapped as suicide bombers, have further alienated Al Qaeda-Iraq from the Iraqi people.

And the tenacious pursuit of AQI, together with AQI's loss of local support in many areas, has substantially reduced its capabilities, numbers, and freedom of movement.

This chart displays the cumulative effect of the effort against Al Qaeda-Iraq and its insurgent allies. As you can see, we've reduced considerably the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoys support and sanctuary, though clearly there is more to be done.

Having noted that progress, Al Qaeda is still capable of lethal attacks. And we must maintain relentless pressure on the organization, on the networks outside of Iraq that support it and on the resource flows that sustain it.

This chart lays out the comprehensive strategy that we, the Iraqis, and our interagency and international partners are employing to reduce what Al Qaeda-Iraq needs.

As you can see, defeating Al Qaeda in Iraq requires not just actions by our elite counterterrorist forces, but also major operations by coalition and Iraqi conventional forces, a sophisticated intelligence effort, political reconciliation, economic and social programs, information operations initiatives, diplomatic activity, the employment of counterinsurgency principles and detainee operations, and many other actions.

Related to this effort, I applaud Congress' support for additional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets in the upcoming supplemental, as ISR is vital to the success of our operations in Iraq and elsewhere.

As we combat AQI we must remember that doing so not only reduces a major source of instability in Iraq, it also weakens an organization that Al Qaeda's senior leaders view as a tool to spread its influence and foment regional instability. Osama bin laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri have consistently advocated exploiting the situation in Iraq , and we have also seen Al Qaeda-Iraq involved in destabilizing activities in the wider Mideast region.

Together with the Iraqi security forces we have also focused on the special groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed and directed by Iran 's Quds Force with help from Lebanese Hezbollah. It was these groups that launched Iranian rockets and mortar rounds at Iraq 's seat of government two weeks ago, causing loss of innocent life and fear in the capital, and requiring Iraqi and coalition actions in response.

Iraqi and coalition leaders have repeatedly noted their desire that Iran live up to the promises made by President Ahmadinejad and other senior Iranian leaders to stop their support for the special groups.

However, nefarious activities by the Quds Force have continued and Iraqi leaders now clearly recognize the threat they pose to Iraq . We should all watch Iranian actions closely in the weeks and months ahead as they will show the kind of relationship Iran wishes to have with its neighbor and the character of future Iranian involvement in Iraq .

The Iraqi security forces have continued to develop since September, and we have transferred responsibilities to Iraqi forces as their capabilities and the conditions on the ground have permitted. Currently, as this chart shows, half of Iraq 's 18 provinces are under provincial Iraqi control. Many of these provinces, not just the successful ones in the Kurdish regional government area but also a number of southern provinces, have done well.

Challenges have emerged in some other, including of course Basra . Nonetheless, this process will continue and we expect Anbar and Qadisiyah provinces to transition in the months ahead.

Iraqi forces have grown significantly since September, and over 540,000 individuals now serve in the Iraqi security forces.

The number of combat battalions capable of taking the lead in operations, albeit with some coalition support, has grown to well over 100. These units are bearing an increasing share of the burden, as evidenced by the fact that Iraqi security losses have recently been three times our own.

We will, of course, conduct careful after-action reviews with our Iraqi partners in the wake of recent operations, as there were units and leaders found wanting in some cases, and some of our assessments may be downgraded as a result.

Nonetheless, the performance of many units was solid, especially once they get their footing and gained a degree of confluence. And certain Iraqi elements proved quite capable.

Underpinning the advances of the past year has been improvements in Iraq 's security institutions.

An increasingly robust Iraqi-run training base enabled the Iraqi security forces to grow by over 133,000 soldiers and police over the past 16 months. And the still-expanding training base is expected to generate an additional 50,000 Iraqi soldiers and 16 army and special operations battalions through the rest of 2008, along with 23,000 police and eight national police battalions.

Additionally, Iraq 's security ministries are steadily improving their ability to execute their budgets. As this chart shows, in 2007, as in 2006, Iraq 's security ministries spent more on their forces than the United States provided through the Iraqi Security Forces Fund.

We anticipate that Iraq will spend over $8 billion on security this year and $11 billion next year. And this projection enabled us recently to reduce significantly our Iraqi Security Forces Fund request for fiscal year 2009 from $5.1 billion to $2.8 billion.

While improved Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to defend Iraq or maintain security throughout the country on their own, recent operations in Basra highlight improvements in the ability of the Iraqi security forces to deploy substantial numbers of units, supplies and replacements on very short notice. They certainly could not have deployed a division's worth of army and police units on such short notice a year ago. On the other hand, the recent operations also underscored the considerable work still to be done in the area of logistics, force enablers, staff development, and command and control.

We also continue to help Iraq through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. As of March 2008, the Iraqi government has purchased over $2 billion worth of equipment and services of American origin through FMS.

Since September, and with your encouragement of the organizations and the FMS progress -- process delivery has improved, as the FMS system has strived to support urgent war-time requirements.

On a related note, I would ask that Congress consider restoring funding for the International Military Education and Training program which supports education for mid- and senior-level Iraqi military and civilian leaders and is an important component of the development of the leaders Iraq will need in the future.

While security has improved in many areas, and the Iraqi security forces are shouldering more of the load, the situation in Iraq remains exceedingly complex and challenging.

Iraq could face a resurgence of Al Qaeda-Iraq, or additional Shia groups could violate Muqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire order and return to violence. External actors, like Iran , could stoke violence within Iraq and actions by other neighbors could undermine the security situation as well.

Other challenges result, paradoxically, from improved security, which has provided opportunities for political and economic progress and improved services at the local, provincial and national levels.

But the improvements have also created expectations that progress will continue.

In the coming months, Iraq leaders must strengthen governmental capacity, execute budgets, pass additional legislation, conduct provincial elections, carry out a census, determine the status of disputed territories, and resettle internally displaced persons and refugees. These tasks would challenge any government, much less a still-developing government tested by war.

The Commander's Emergency Response Program, the State Department's Quick Response Fund, and USAID programs enable us to help Iraq deal with its challenges. To that end, I respectfully ask that you provide us by June the additional CERP funds requested in the supplemental. These funds have an enormous impact. As I noted earlier, the salaries paid to the Sons of Iraq alone cost far less than the cost savings in vehicles not lost due to the enhanced security in local communities.

Encouragingly, the Iraqi government recently allocated $300 million for us to manage as Iraqi CERP to perform projects for their people, while building their own capacity to do so. The Iraqi government has also committed $163 million to gradually assume Sons of Iraq contracts, $510 million for small-business loans, and $196 million for a joint training and reintegration program.

The Iraqi government pledges to provide more as they execute the budget passed two months ago. Nonetheless, it is hugely important to have our resources continue even as Iraqi funding begins to outstrip ours.

Last month I provided my chain of command recommendations for the way ahead in Iraq . During that process, I noted the objective of retaining and building on our hard-fought security gains, while we draw down to the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams. I emphasized the need to continue work with our Iraqi partners to secure the population and to transition responsibilities to the Iraqis as quickly as conditions permits but without jeopardizing the security gains that have been made.

As in September, my recommendations are informed by operational and strategic considerations. The operational considerations include recognition that: the military surge has achieved progress, but that that progress is reversible; Iraqi security forces have strengthened their capabilities, but still must grow further; the provincial elections in the fall, refugee returns, detainee releases, and efforts to resolve provincial boundaries disputes and Article 140 issues will be very challenging; the transition of Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi security forces or other pursuits will require time and careful monitoring; withdrawing too many forces too quickly could jeopardize the progress of the past year; and performing the necessary tasks in Iraq will require sizable conventional forces, as well as special operation forces and adviser teams.

The strategic considerations include recognition that: the strain on the U.S. military, especially on its ground forces, has been considerable; a number of the security challenges inside Iraq are also related to significant regional and global threats; a failed state in Iraq would pose serious consequences for the greater fight against Al Qaeda, for regional stability, for the already existing humanitarian crisis in Iraq, and for the efforts to counter malign Iranian influence.

After weighing these factors, I recommended to my chain of command that we continue the drawdown in the surge to the combat forces and that upon the withdrawal of the last surge brigade combat team in July, we undertake a 45-day period of consolidation and evaluation. At the end of that period, we will commence a process of assessment to examine the conditions on the ground and over time determine when we can make recommendations for further reductions. This process will be continuous, with recommendations for further reductions made as conditions permit.

This approach does not allow establishment of a set withdrawal timetable, however it does provide the flexibility those of us on the ground need to preserve the still-fragile security gains our troopers have fought so far and sacrifice so much to achieve.

With this approach, the security achievements of 2007 and early 2008 can form a foundation for the gradual establishment of sustainable security in Iraq . This is not only important to the 27 million citizens of Iraq , it is also vitally important to those in the Gulf region, to the citizens of the United States , and to the global community.

It clearly is in our national interests to help Iraq prevent the resurgence of Al Qaeda in the heart of the Arab world, to help Iraq resist Iranian encroachment on its sovereignty, to avoid renewed ethno-sectarian violence that could spill over Iraq's borders and make the existing refugee crisis even worse, and to enable Iraq to expand its role in the regional and global economies.

In closing, I want to comment briefly on those serving our nation in Iraq . We have asked a great deal of them and of their families, and they have made enormous sacrifices.

My keen personal awareness of the strain on them and on the force as a whole has been an important factor in my recommendations.

The Congress, the executive branch and our fellow citizens have done an enormous amount to support our troopers and their loved ones. And all of us are grateful for that.

Nothing means more to those in harm's way than the knowledge that their country appreciates their sacrifices and those of their families. Indeed, all Americans should take great pride in the men and women serving our nation in Iraq and in the courage, determination, resilience and initiative they demonstrate each and every day. It remains the greatest of honors to soldier with them.

Thank you very much.

Discuss.

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Thanks for posting up the Petraeus transcript, guys. . . I'll link it up tonight at my blog.

I've seen you all referenced a ton of times on other blogs, but this is my first time here. It's a nice looking site! :)

I'm reading over at Tom Rick's place (full of left wing crack heads and Tom's usualy BS, but some cool graphics).

http://blog.washingtonpost.com/iraq-debate/

Crocker Testimony

Slides from presentation

Unbelievable.